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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most significant features of the 1978 Bankruptcy Re-
form Act 1 was markedly broadened versions of the automatic and
* Associate Professor of Law, Washington University. B.A., Monmouth College, 1983; J.D.,
University of Chicago, 1986. I wish to thank Douglass Boshkoff, Christopher Frost, Frank Ken-
nedy, Richard Lazarus, Peter Letsou, Robert Rasmussen, Charles Tabb, and James J. White for
their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
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postdischarge stays.2 If bankruptcy is the refuge for the honest but un-
fortunate debtor,' then the stay is the specific tool that makes the ref-
uge meaningful. Indeed, more than one court has characterized the stay
as a shield that gives the corporate debtor an opportunity to reorganize
4
and affords the individual debtor a chance for the proverbial fresh
start.5
Even courts mindful of the debtor-protection function of the stay,
however, are careful to note that the debtor should use the stay only as
a shield, and not as a sword. Virtually every judge would agree in prin-
ciple that offensive uses of the stay are impermissible.6 Unfortunately,
the judicial consensus against debtors wielding the stay as a weapon has
not been matched by a similar consensus on where to draw the line
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362, 524 (1988); see also infra part II.A.
3. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (stating that one of bankruptcy law's
central policies is to give "the honest but unfortunate debtor. . . a new opportunity in life and a
clear field for future effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting [sic]
debt").
4. See, e.g., In re Briggs Trans. Co., 780 F.2d 1339, 1343 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating that the
automatic stay in corporate reorganization proceedings "shields creditors from each other and is
intended to aid in equitably distributing the debtor's assets in a way that maximizes the interests
of all parties").
5. See, e.g., Stringer v. Huet (In re Stringer), 847 F.2d 549, 551 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining
that in the case of individual bankruptcy the automatic stay "was designed to shield the debtor
from financial pressure during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding").
The notion of bankruptcy as a "fresh start" for the individual debtor is hardly a recent con-
cept. See, e.g., Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904) (stating that "[s]ystems of bankruptcy
are designed to relieve the honest debtor from the weight of indebtedness which has become op-
pressive and to permit him to have a fresh start in business or commercial life, freed from the
obligation and responsibilities which may have resulted from business misfortunes").
6. See, e.g., Oberg v. AETNA Casualty & Sur. Co. (In re A.H. Robins Co., Inc.), 828 F.2d
1023, 1026 (4th Cir. 1987) (stating that "[o]ur system of law universally frowns on a party who
would use the stay as both a sword and a shield"); Bohack Corp. v. Borden, Inc. (In re The Bohack
Corp.), 599 F.2d 1160, 1168 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that courts "must be cautious to avoid a decision
which could convert Rule 11-44 [pre-Code stay] from a shield into a weapon"); Bernstein v. IDT
Corp., 76 B.R. 275, 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (decrying use of stay "as a sword instead of a shield");
Boone v. Beacon Bldg. Corp., 613 F. Supp. 1151, 1155 (D.N.J. 1985) (stating that the automatic
stay provisions of the Bankruptcy Act only operate "in actions where the petitioner is in a defen-
sive posture") (emphasis in original); Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Sanyo Elec., Inc., 33 B.R.
996, 1000 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (noting that "the stay is not designed to be an offensive weapon-a
sword"); Drubner v. Gaslight Village (In re Gaslight Village, Inc.), 8 B.R. 866, 870 (D. Conn. 1981)
(stating that "[t]he automatic stay under Code § 362 was not intended to be used as a weapon or
club to reduce secured creditors into submission"); Central Fidelity Bank v. Cooper (In re Cooper),
116 B.R. 469, 472 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990) (asserting that codebtor stay of Code § 1301 "is to be
used as a shield and not as a sword"); Jandous Elec. Constr. Corp. v. City of New York (In re
Jandous Elec. Constr. Corp.), 106 B.R. 48, 50 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that debtor "may
not use the automatic stay as a sword when the debtor is the plaintiff in a pending nonbankruptcy
suit"); Walter E. Heller & Co. v. Food Mktg. Assoc., Ltd. (In re Fasano/Harris Pie Co.), 43 B.R.
864, 870 n.14 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984) (decrying use of stay "as a sword ... rather than as a
shield to preserve the status quo"). But see Pettibone Corp. v. Baker (In re Pettibone Corp.), 110
B.R. 848, 855 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990) (stating that the debtor's alleged offensive use of the stay "is
precisely what the law allows a debtor to do").
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between offensive and defensive uses of the well-known bankruptcy
device.
In a number of important and recurring cases courts regularly are
allowing both individual and corporate debtors to use the stay offen-
sively as a means of extracting a future benefit from a nondebtor party
to whom the debtor owes a prepetition debt. The dangers of this trend
are subtle but significant. With an increase in use of the stay as a
weapon will come a decrease in the willingness of nondebtor parties to
extend credit to financially troubled corporations and individuals.7 Fur-
thermore, offensive uses of the stay will compromise the equality of
treatment and value-preservation goals of corporate bankruptcy,8 while
exacerbating the moral hazard problem inherent in an individual
debtor's discharge right.9
Part II of this Article proposes a simple and functional test to dis-
tinguish offensive from defensive uses of the stay that is consistent with
the historical underpinnings of the Bankruptcy Code's automatic and
postdischarge stays.1" The proposed test defines as an offensive use of
the stay any situation in which the court compels the nondebtor party
to grant the debtor future benefits when the debtor has not first as-
sumed preexisting burdens owed to the nondebtor party. The founda-
tions of the test are then justified by reference to a general linkage of
burdens with benefits that pervades both the Code and well-established
bankruptcy case law."
Part III sets out five categories of cases in which courts have al-
lowed debtors to use the stay as a sword: conditional refusals to deal; 2
license renewals;' 3 college transcript withholdings; 4 banks' administra-
tive freezes on debtor accounts;15 and consumer secured installment
loans.' 6 Part III explores the manner in which courts run afoul of the
proposed test for distinguishing offensive from defensive uses of the
stay in each of the five situations. Further, Part III shows how these
cases are inconsistent with the burden/benefit theme that is found both
in the Code and in the case law. Part III also examines how the antidis-
7. See infra notes 59-61, 119-20 and accompanying text; part IV.B.
8. See infra part IV.A.
9. See infra part IV.B.
10. See infra part II.A. All further references in the text and footnotes will refer to the Bank-
ruptcy Code simply as "the Code."
11. See infra part II.B.
12. See infra part III.A.
13. See infra part ILI.B.
14. See infra part 11I.C.
15. See infra part I1I.D.
16. See infra part nI.E.
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crimination provision of the Code17 should affect the outcomei in the
categories of cases explored.
Finally, Part IV considers in greater detail the costs of continued
judicial misuse of bankruptcy's stays, in both cases involving corporate
debtors and those involving individual debtors.
II. DEFINING OFFENSIVE USES OF THE STAY
A. A Brief History of the Stay
Any discussion of the stay in bankruptcy must begin by distin-
guishing the so-called "automatic stay" from the postdischarge stay.
The automatic stay of Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code takes effect
the moment a debtor files a bankruptcy petition with the bankruptcy
court and generally lasts until the case ends or a discharge is granted. 18
There are several categories of enumerated acts against debtors that
Section 362 prohibits, but the broadest of these prohibitions is found in
Section 362(a)(6), which bars "any act to collect, assess or recover a
[prepetition] claim" against the debtor. 9
The postdischarge stay, in contrast, generally picks up where the
automatic stay leaves off.20 In its broadest form the postdischarge stay
of Section 524 purports to enjoin any act to collect, recover, or offset a
discharged debt.2' Unlike the automatic stay, the postdischarge stay
theoretically has no point of expiration.22
17. 11 U.S.C. § 525 (1988).
18. Section 362 begins by stating that "a petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this
title ... operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of [various enumerated acts]." Id. § 362(a).
Section 362(c) provides that, absent a lift of stay, the automatic stay of acts against property of
the estate "continues until such property is no longer property of the estate." Id. § 362(c)(1).
Section 362(c) states that the stay will continue until the earliest of three events: (1) the closing of
the case; (2) dismissal of the case; or (3) the time when a discharge is granted or denied. Id. §
362(c)(2).
Section 362(d) also provides that the court may lift the stay on request of a party in interest.
Id. § 362(d). Section 362(d)(1) provides that the court shall lift the stay "for cause, including the
lack of adequate protection of an interest in property" of the party petitioning for relief from stay.
Id. § 362(d)(1). Section 362(d)(2) provides that with respect to a stay of acts against property of
the estate, the court shall lift the stay if the debtor lacks equity in the property and the property is
not necessary for an effective reorganization. Id. § 362(d)(2).
19. Id. § 362(a)(6).
20. This will be true when, as is typical, the court grants the debtor's discharge. Under §
362(c)(2)(C), the grant of discharge will end the automatic stay, but the postdischarge stay of § 524
takes effect immediately upon discharge. Id. § 362(c)(2)(C); see § 524 (beginning with statement
that "[a] discharge in a case under this title" has enumerated injunctive effects).
21. Section 524(a)(2) provides that a discharge in bankruptcy "operates as an injunction
against the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to
collect, recover or offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not dis-
charge of such debt is waived." Id. § 524(a)(2).
22. A creditor may avoid the effects of a debtor's discharge by entering into a formal reaffir-
mation agreement with the debtor. Such an agreement must be made prior to the court granting
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The Bankruptcy Reform Act significantly enhanced the power and
scope of both the automatic and postdischarge stays.2 3 Prior to the Re-
form Act, the United States Supreme Court had promulgated the Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure, which created several stays that collectively
were comparable to the automatic stay.24 Many courts, however, inter-
preted those stays to cover only formal judicial actions by creditors to
collect debts.25 In contrast, both the broader language of Section 362
and its legislative history indicate that the Code's automatic stay provi-
sion should prohibit all attempts, legal or otherwise, by creditors to col-
lect prepetition debts from the debtor.2" Therefore, under the current
automatic stay, even informal collection activities such as making
harassing telephone calls or posting deadbeat signs on the debtor's
premises are violations of the stay.27
Similarly, the postdischarge stay has been strengthened over time.
Originally, the debtor's discharge in bankruptcy was meaningful only as
discharge to the debtor. Id. § 524(c)(1). Nothing in the Code, however, prevents a debtor from
voluntarily repaying a debt that has been discharged. See id. § 524(f).
The Code also provides that certain categories of debts are nondischargeable. See id. § 523(a).
Such categories include certain debts that stem from taxes, fraud, willful injuries, alimony, student
loans, and injuries resulting from a debtor driving while intoxicated. In addition, the Code lists
certain conditions under which a court may deny a discharge entirely, for example, a debtor's
commission of fraud connected to administration of the case. See id. § 727(a).
23. See id. §§ 362, 524.
24. In 1973 the Supreme Court adopted Rule 401, which provided that the filing of a petition
operated as an automatic stay of certain actions on unsecured debts. Rules of Bankruptcy Proce-
dure, 411 U.S. 995, 1048 (1973). The Court also adopted Rule 601, a stay against lien enforcement,
and Rule 13-401, a stay barring actions against the debtor or lien enforcer in cases filed under
Chapter 13. Id. at 1062, 1177. In 1974 the Court adopted an automatic stay available in Chapter 11
cases, Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, 415 U.S. 1007, 1033 (1974), and in 1975 it adopted the stays
that applied to Chapter 10 and Chapter 12 cases. Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, 421 U.S. 1023,
1069, 1116 (1975).
Prior to the promulgation of the Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure, there were a number of stays
in bankruptcy, each fairly limited in scope. See Frank R. Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bank-
ruptcy, 11 U. MicH. JL. REF. 177, 179-86 (1978).
25. See Frank R. Kennedy, Automatic Stays Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. MicH.
J.L. REF. 1, 22 (1978) (asserting that § 362(a)(6) of the Code "overrules the numerous cases that
decline to interfere with nonjudicial efforts to collect debts").
26. Section 362(a)(6) stays "any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor
that arose before the commencement of the case under this title." 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6). The legis-
lative history of § 362 specifically notes that the stay "stops all collection efforts, all harassment,
and all foreclosure actions. It permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan, or
simply to be relieved of the financial pressures that drove him into bankruptcy." HousE CoMm. ON
THE JUDicImRy, BANKRuPTcy LAW REvisION, HR. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977).
27. See, e.g., Sechuan City, Inc. v. North Am. Motor Inns, Inc. (In re Sechuan City, Inc.), 96
B.R. 37 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) (holding that a creditor's signs in hotel lobby indicating that the
debtor restaurant owner was not paying its bills violated § 362(a)(6)). The legislative history of §
362 indicates that Congress intended § 362(a)(6) to prevent creditors from even phoning debtors to
encourage repayment. H.R. REP. No. 595 at 342 (1977); cf. In re Reed, 11 B.R. 258 (Bankr. D. Utah
1981) (holding that dumping garbage on a debtor's lawn violates stay).
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an affirmative defense to state court collection actions brought by credi-
tors. whose debts had been discharged.2" The problem with this version
of discharge was that many ill-informed debtors either failed to recog-
nize the necessity of pleading the affirmative defense or simply did not
appear in court at all, enabling the creditor to continue collection ef-
forts unimpeded by the discharge.2" Thus, the discharge provided little
postbankruptcy protection to an uninformed debtor.
In 1970 Congress passed legislation amending the discharge provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Act.3 0 These amendments expanded the power
of the bankruptcy court by permitting it to enjoin any formal collection
actions brought by creditors on discharged debts.3' That new injunctive
power, however, did not encompass creditors' nonjudicial attempts to
collect discharged debts, as does the Code in Section 524.2
28. See Doug Rendleman, The Bankruptcy Discharge: Toward a Fresher Start, 58 N.C. L.
REv. 723, 727-32 (1980).
29. Id. at 729-30.
30. Act of Oct. 19, 1970, 84 Stat. 990, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1330 (1988); see also Kennedy, supra note 24, at 186-87.
31. Kennedy, supra note 24, at 186.
32. See Rendleman, supra note 28, at 734 (noting that the legislative history of dis-
chargeability amendments of 1970 supports the view that Congress did not intend to forbid "the
informal, nonjudicial tactics like threatening collection letters that creditors used to secure reaffir-
mation"); see also H.R. REP. No. 595, at 365-66 (noting that § 524 "has been expanded over a
comparable provision in Bankruptcy Act § 14f to cover any act to collect, such as dunning by
telephone or letter, or indirectly through friends, relatives, or employers, harassment, threats of
repossession, and the like").
Also significant in the development of both stays has been the increase in sanctions available
to the bankruptcy court against those who transgress the stay. After the Bankruptcy Rules gave
bankruptcy judges formal injunction ability, the bankruptcy court gained the power to hold credi-
tors in contempt in order to enforce the postdischarge stay. Prior to the enactment of the Code,
however, that contempt power was rarely exercised against recalcitrant creditors. But see Fidelity
Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc. (In Re Fidelity Mortgage Investors), 550 F.2d 47 (2d
Cir. 1976) (holding general contractors in contempt for initiating state court action against a Chap-
ter 11 debtor without first securing permission of the bankruptcy court). Rule 920 of the Bank-
ruptcy Rules of Procedure allowed courts to impose sanctions for violation of the discharge
injunction. See Rendleman, supra note 28, at 733. Professor Rendleman noted that "[t]he bank-
ruptcy judges wielded the contempt rule as hesitantly as the Advisory Committee and the Su-
preme Court that had promulgated it." Id. at 734. Prior to the Bankruptcy Rules of 1970,
bankruptcy judges apparently never used the contempt power they had to enforce the automatic
stay. See Kennedy, supra note 24, at 259. Professor Kennedy pointed out that although he could
find no case imposing or considering the contempt sanction against a violator of the statutory stays
that predated the Bankruptcy Rules, there are cases in which courts imposed monetary sanctions
for violation of the Bankruptcy Rule stays. Id.
Once the Code was in place, bankruptcy courts did not hesitate to use their contempt power to
remedy violations of both stays. See, e.g., Mountain Am. Credit Union v. Skinner (In re Skinner),
917 F.2d 444 (10th Cir. 1990) (upholding a bankruptcy court's contempt power for a § 362 viola-
tion); In re Simonetti, 117 B.R. 708 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (using contempt power to remedy a
violation of a § 524 postdischarge injunction). In 1984 Congress codified a power that courts al-
ready had by amending § 362 to give the bankruptcy court the right to assess actual damages,
including attorney's fees, against willful stay violators. Act of July 10, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
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Although the Code significantly increased the breadth of the bank-
ruptcy stay, nowhere in the new stay provisions or in their legislative
history did Congress suggest that debtors could use the stay as a tool to
coerce nondebtor parties to provide them with future benefits.33 This
Article proposes a test for distinguishing permissible defensive uses of
the stay from inappropriate offensive uses. An impermissible offensive
use is defined as any situation in which the debtor invokes the stay to
obtain future benefits from a nondebtor party. For example, under this
test, a debtor could not compel a supplier to whom the debtor owed
prepetition debts to provide further goods or services to the debtor,
even on a cash basis, if the debtor did not first satisfy the prepetition
claims in full. This proposed test challenges many current judicial in-
terpretations defining the stay's appropriate scope. 4
Although the test is at odds with many case holdings, it is consis-
tent with the 1978 Reform Act's expansion of the stay from a prohibi-
tion of only formal court actions on prepetition debts to a prohibition
of all acts to collect prepetition debts. 5 The standard proposed herein
would continue to construe the stay as barring both formal and infor-
mal actions on the part of creditors to collect prepetition debts.
The proposed test would, however, allow a nondebtor party to con-
dition its grant of future benefits to the debtor on the debtor's repay-
ment of prepetition debts to the nondebtor party. Some courts have
construed such a conditional refusal to deal as a veiled act to collect a
prepetition debt which therefore violates the stay. 6 These courts fail to
recognize that bankruptcy law routinely allows creditors to condition
future benefits to a debtor on the debtor's cure of prepetition defaults
owed to that creditor. This linkage of burdens with benefits is specifi-
cally sanctioned by various provisions of the Code and by case law
Title MI, §§ 304, 363(b), 392, 441, 98 Stat. 352, 363, 365, 371 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §
362(h) (1988)). That provision also enables bankruptcy courts to award debtors punitive damages
"in appropriate circumstances." 11 U.S.C. § 362(h).
33. See generally H.R REP. No. 595, at 340-44, 365-66 (legislative history of §§ 362 and 524).
Professor Rendleman, commenting on the Code's broadened versions of the stay, asserts that
the new broadened stays should prevent nonjudicial harassment such as letters, phone calls, and
certain refusals to deal, including credit unions refusing future service and colleges refusing to
provide transcripts. Rendleman, supra note 28, at 751-52. Professor Rendleman fails to appreciate,
however, the distinction between bare attempts to collect through letters and phone calls, and the
mere withholding of future benefits pending payment. The legislative history speaks only in terms
of expanding the stay to prevent both informal and legal attempts to collect. There is no indication
in the legislative history that Congress intended the stays to enable debtors to insist on future
benefits from creditors without first assuming prepetition burdens.
34. See infra part Il.
35. See supra part II.A.
36. See infra note 55.
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outside of the stay area. 7
B. Bankruptcy's Burden/Benefit Linkage
1. In the Code
A general theme throughout various Code provisions is that a
debtor wishing to gain benefits from a nondebtor party must assume
burdens oWed to that party. A classic example of this burden/benefit
linkage is the Code's rule concerning a debtor's ability to assume execu-
tory contracts. Section 365 provides that "if there has been a default in
an executory contract" of a debtor, the trustee must not only give ade-
quate assurance of its future performance, but also cure any prepetition
defaults on the contract.38
Although the mechanism in Section 365 is typically used by corpo-
rate debtors, 9 there is an analogue in the Code for individual debtors.
Section 524, the Code's reaffirmation provision, is a formal means for
the individual debtor to assume prepetition burdens that would other-
wise be dischargeable.40 Congress, by providing this formal reaffirma-
tion section, was acknowledging that in certain situations it makes
sense for the debtor to effect a selective waiver of her discharge right.4 '
More significantly, the reaffirmation provision reflects the view that if
the debtor wishes to gain a postdischarge benefit from a particular
party, the nondebtor party has the right to insist that the debtor as-
sume prepetition burdens owed to that party.
Another prominent example of the burden/benefit theme pervading
the Code is the setoff provision in Section 553. Section 553 permits a
prepetition creditor to set off claims to the debtor's estate against any
obligations the creditor owes to the debtor.42 In effect, Section 553 pro-
hibits the debtor from demanding the benefit of full repayment from a
37. See infra part I.B.
38. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) (1988).
39. Section 365 is typically used by corporate debtors because in a Chapter 7 liquidation case
a trustee is automatically appointed and has the power to assume or reject executory contracts of
the debtor. See id. §§ 701-04 (providing for the selection and duties of Chapter 7 trustee); id. §
365(a) (permitting the trustee to assume or reject executory contracts of the debtor). The individ-
ual debtor who files a Chapter 13 case has the power, pursuant to § 1322(b)(7), to assume or reject
executory contracts as part of the bankruptcy plan. Id. § 1322(b)(7) (incorporating the rules of §
365). The most common user of § 365 is a corporate Chapter 11 debtor-in-possession. Debtors-in-
possession generally remain in control of a company and have all of the powers that a trustee
normally has, including the power to assume or reject executory contracts. Id. § 1107(a) (giving a
debtor-in-possession most of the rights of a trustee).
40. Id. § 524(c) (outlining the prerequisites of a valid reaffirmation agreement).
41. See id. § 524(c)(3), (c)(6) (permitting reaffirmation only if debtor's attorney determines
that agreement imposes no undue hardship on debtor or, when the debtor is not represented, if the
court determines that a reaffirmation agreement is in debtor's best interest).
42. See id. § 553(a).
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creditor while at the same time relegating the creditor to an incomplete
recovery of the debtor's obligation. Thus, the debtor is not allowed the
benefit of repayment without assuming the burden of comparable
satisfaction.
2. In the Case Law
Some of the most significant manifestations of bankruptcy's bur-
den/benefit linkage are found not in the Code itself, but in well-estab-
lished bankruptcy case law. For example, the fundamental concept of
lien pass-through is never specifically mentioned in the Code, although
the legislative history of Section 522 affirms the continued viability of
that common-law provision. 43 Under the lien pass-through doctrine, if a
creditor has a valid lien on property of the debtor that is not avoided in
the bankruptcy case, the lien survives the debtor's discharge. 44 Thus, if
the debtor wants the benefit of retaining a secured creditor's collateral,
she must somehow assume the burden of paying that creditor for its
lien interest.4 5
Another example of the burden/benefit theme in bankruptcy case
law is the general recognition of valid transfer restrictions on property
of the estate. If, for example, the debtor owns a seat on the Board of
Trade that cannot be transferred without first satisfying all of the
debtor's Board creditors, then the bankruptcy estate must also contend
with that transfer restriction.4 Thus, the estate may enjoy the benefit
of selling the property only at the cost of assuming the burden of first
satisfying the debtor's Board of Trade creditors.
Two other common-law doctrines further demonstrate the ten-
dency of courts to condition a debtor's ability to secure future benefits
on the debtor's willingness to assume past burdens. The doctrine of
cross-collateralization enables a postpetition lender to gain collateral
not only for its new loans, but also for unsecured loans that were not
43. See H.R. REP. No. 595, at 361.
44. See Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886); see also In re Pence, 905 F.2d 1107, 1109 (7th
Cir. 1990) (stating that "Congress' recent amendment of section 506(d) could only be viewed as
codifying, or recodifying, the long-established rule of the Long line of cases that a secured creditor
need not participate in a bankruptcy proceeding to preserve his lien" (citation omitted & emphasis
in original)); In re Tarnow, 749 F.2d 464, 465 (7th Cir. 1984) (explaining that the Long doctrine
"allows a creditor with a loan secured by a lien on the assets of a debtor who becomes bankrupt
before the loan is repaid to ignore the bankruptcy proceeding and look to the lien for the satisfac-
tion of the debt").
45. Two vehicles a debtor may use to assume the burden of paying the creditor for its lien
interest are reaffirmation, 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1988), and redemption, id. § 722.
46. Board of Trade v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1 (1924). Even after the enactment of the Code,
courts continue to cite with approval the holding in Board of Trade. See, e.g., Chicago Mercantile
Exch. v. United States, 840 F.2d 1352, 1355 (7th Cir. 1988).
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repaid by the debtor prior to its bankruptcy filing.47 Cross-collateraliza-
tion thereby allows the postpetition lender to condition future credit on
the debtor's agreement to assume, through the granting of collateral,
unsatisfied burdens owed to that lender.
Similarly, the common-law doctrine of necessity enables a supplier
of goods or services to condition future dealings with a debtor on the
debtor's payment of prepetition unsecured claims to the supplier.48 The
doctrine of necessity, like the other case law and Code doctrines dis-
cussed above, recognizes that a nondebtor party may condition its will-
ingness to offer special benefits to the debtor on the debtor's fulfillment
of existing obligations owed to the nondebtor.
III. OFFENSIVE USES OF THE STAY: RECURRING CASES
A. Refusals to Deal
1. Corporate Debtors
Imagine for a moment that Debtor is a retail shoe seller and Credi-
tor is a supplier that manufactures shoes.49 Debtor and Creditor have a
one-year requirements contract in which Creditor agrees to sell to
Debtor at the beginning of each month the dress shoes Debtor needs for
that month. 0 Debtor is obligated to pay Creditor for the shoes, at Cred-
itor's then-prevailing rate, within ten days following receipt of the
shoes.
Midway through the fourth month of the contract, Debtor files a
Chapter 11 petition. Debtor wishes to continue purchasing shoes from
Creditor while Debtor is reorganizing in bankruptcy.5 1 Debtor likes the
price and quality of Creditor's shoes, and Creditor is conveniently lo-
cated for Debtor's business. In addition, Creditor sells a couple of popu-
lar shoe lines that Debtor is unable to obtain easily from another
manufacturer.
For all of these reasons, Debtor wants to enforce its prepetition
contract with Creditor. Debtor, however, does not make this decision
47. See infra text accompanying notes 99-103.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 75-77.
49. This hypothetical is based loosely on the facts of Ike Kempner & Bros., Inc. v. U.S. Shoe
Corp. (In re Ike Kempner & Bros., Inc.), 4 B.R. 31 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1980).
50. The Uniform Commercial Code specifically sanctions the enforceability of output and
requirements contracts. See U.C.C. § 2-306 (1990).
51. When a company files a Chapter 11 petition, it thereby assumes an identity that is tech-
nically distinct from the prepetition entity. The debtor company is then known formally as a
"debtor-in-possession." 11 U.S.C. § 1101(1) (1988). Although it is cloaked with a new name, the
debtor-in-possession may continue to operate the business. See id. § 1107(a) (stating that the
debtor-in-possession shall have the rights and powers of a trustee); id. § 1108 (providing that a
trustee's powers include operation of the debtor's business).
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until two weeks into the case, and by that time, Debtor is officially in
breach of its contract with Creditor, since Debtor has failed to pay
Creditor for its most recent shipment of shoes. Debtor wonders
whether, notwithstanding its breach, it may enforce Creditor's contrac-
tual obligation to continue supplying shoes.
In this scenario, the Code is quite clear on two points. First, Debtor
may indeed continue to enforce the contract notwithstanding the ex-
isting breach.52 Second, Debtor may insist on contractual performance
from Creditor only if Debtor first pays Creditor for the shoes Creditor
delivered prepetition5
Now consider a slight change in the facts. Imagine that Debtor and
Creditor conduct the same monthly transactions, but without a specific
contract. That is, Debtor and Creditor engage in a regular series of
monthly shoe transactions, but do not commit in advance to any spe-
cific duration of the arrangement. Once again, the payment term is ten
days subsequent to Debtor's receipt of the shoes. Furthermore, as in the
first example, Debtor files Chapter 11 bankruptcy when its payment for
the last shipment of shoes is overdue.
Although it is in bankruptcy, Debtor would like to continue buying
shoes from Creditor. Shortly after the bankruptcy filing, Debtor ap-
proaches Creditor and offers to do business on a cash-in-advance basis
52. Section 365 permits the debtor-in-possession, with the court's approval, to assume or
reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor. Id. § 365(a). Section 365 also specif-
ically allows the debtor-in-possession to assume an executory contract or lease notwithstanding the
existence of a default. Id. § 365(b)(1).
The drafters of the Code did not specifically define an executory contract, but one widely cited
definition is that proposed by Professor Vern Countryman. Professor Countryman defines an exec-
utory contract as "a contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party
to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete performance would
constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other." Vern Countryman, Executory
Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439, 460 (1973). Michael Andrew has proposed
a slightly different definition of an executory contract. Andrew defines an executory contract as
consisting of two necessary components: "(a) debtor and non-debtor each have unperformed obli-
gations, and (b) the debtor, if it ceased further performance, would have no right to the other
party's continued performance." Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Under-
standing "Rejection," 59 U. COLO. L. REv. 845, 893 (1988).
53. Section 365(b)(1) requires the debtor-in-possession to do three things in order to assume
an executory contract that is in default: cure the default, or provide adequate assurance that the
trustee will promptly cure such default; compensate the nondebtor party for damages suffered
pursuant to the default, or provide adequate assurance that the trustee will provide such prompt
compensation; and provide adequate assurance of future performance under the contract or lease.
Professor Jay Westbrook describes the debtor's obligation to cure before assuming as part of
the "cost of sale" of the executory contract to the bankruptcy estate. He notes that if the estate's
expense of performing the contract exceeds the proceeds obtained under the contract, the debtor-
in-possession will suffer a net loss by assuming the contract. See Jay L. Westbrook, A Functional
Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REv. 227, 247 (1989). Courts have made it clear that
a debtor-in-possession must assume or reject a contract in total, and thus may not assume only
beneficial parts. See, e.g., NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 531-32 (1984).
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so that Creditor will incur no future credit risk. Creditor agrees to con-
tinue doing business, but only on one condition: Debtor must first pay
Creditor in full for the prepetition shipment of shoes.
Initially, Creditor's position in the second hypothetical may appear
stronger than its position in the first. In the first situation, Creditor had
a specific legal obligation to supply shoes for the rest of the contract,
although the obligation was contingent on Debtor's return performance.
In the second situation, Creditor had no such legal obligation. Thus,
because Creditor has no legal obligation to do business with Debtor, it
seems that Qreditor should be able to condition its continued dealings
with Debtor on Debtor's payment in full for the prepetition shoe
delivery.
Many courts, unfortunately, fail to appreciate the analogy between
the second situation and the standard executory contract scenario.
These courts would contend that in the second hypothetical Creditor's
condition that Debtor cure prepetition obligations owed to Creditor
before it will engage in future business with Debtor violates the auto-
matic stay.54 Such courts characterize the conditional 'refusal to deal as
"any act to collect" a prepetition debt.55 This interpretation of the stay
gives Debtor a weapon, thus enabling it to gain benefits from Creditor
that Debtor could not have required absent its bankruptcy filing.
Furthermore, these "offensive stay" decisions create an anomalous
situation in which Debtor acquires leverage against parties who owe it
no legal duties yet lacks such leverage against parties who do owe
Debtor specific contractual obligations." Under these holdings, a bank-
ruptcy court can force a creditor with no contractual duty to the debtor
to do further business without insisting on a cure of the debtor's prepe-
tition defaults. On the other hand, a court cannot force a creditor who
54. See infra text accompanying notes 65-73.
55. See, e.g., In re Guinn, 102 B.R. 838, 842-43 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1989); Karsh Travel, Inc. v.
Airlines Reporting Corp. (In re Karsh Travel, Inc.), 87 B.R. 110, 111-12 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1988),
aff'd, 102 B.R. 778 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Sportfame of Ohio, Inc. v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. (In re
Sportfame of Ohio, Inc.), 40 B.R. 47, 50 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984); In re Haffner, 25 B.R. 882, 886-
87 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1982).
56. Other commentators have noted this anomaly in other situations. See DOUOLAS G. BAIRD
& THOMAS H. JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 669-72 (2d ed. 1990)
(noting the argument that a refusal-to-deal case "is no different in principle" than the one that
arises in a situation in which a nondebtor party who has an executory contract wishes to condition
its future dealings with the debtor on the debtor's payment of prepetition debts); Russell A. Eisen-
berg & Frances F. Gecker, The Doctrine of Necessity and its Parameters, 73 MARQ. L. REv. 1, 7-8
(1989) (using § 365(b), on assumption of executory contracts, among other statutory provisions, to
justify the doctrine of necessity); Richard L. Epling, Preconfirmation or Preclosing Payment of
Prepetition Claims in Bankruptcy, 91 CONN. L.J. 187, 193-94 (1989) (noting the unfairness of al-
lowing a prepetition creditor whose contract is assumed to receive a preference while a similarly
situated prepetition creditor whose contract is rejected becomes an unsecured creditor).
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does have an executory contract with the debtor to render future bene-
fits to the debtor until the debtor cures its prepetition defaults to that
creditor.5 7
In creating the executory contracts section of the Code, why did
the drafters decide to condition the debtor's ability to assume existing
57. However, the creditor who has an executory contract will not necessarily be in a better
position than a similarly situated creditor who lacks such a contract. The creditor with an execu-
tory contract may be worse off, for example, when the contract contains a set price for future
deliveries and that price has become favorable to the debtor by the time of the bankruptcy filing.
When a market shift occurs, the creditor without an executory contract is not bound to sell at the
earlier lower price. Absent such a price fluctuation, however, an offensive use of the stay may put a
supplier who owes specific obligations to the debtor in a better position than a similarly situated
third party who owes no such obligations. The pricing question in these situations raises several
issues. First, a creditor without an executory contract could potentially avoid the effects of an
offensive stay by raising its postpetition price to the debtor to reflect the unpaid prepetition debts.
This probably would not work because such a back door attempt to recover the prepetition debt
would likely be apparent to the court. In the Sportfame case, for example, the court forced a
supplier to continue doing business with the debtor, emphasizing that "[als far as possible, the
parties shall operate on a normal business relationship consistent with their previous course of
dealing over the past ten years." 40 B.R. at 53. See also Charles J. Tabb, Emergency Preferential
Orders in Bankruptcy Reorganizations, 65 Am. BANKR. L.J. 75, 98 (1991) (noting that "bankruptcy
judges are not fools, and can see through transparent schemes to do by indirection what is not
permitted directly").
A second pricing issue that arises is why a supplier that has such monopoly-like leverage with
the debtor does not charge a higher price to the debtor prior to bankruptcy than it charges to
customers with whom it lacks such leverage. The answer may be that customers of the supplier
prefer uniform pricing, so that any benefits to the supplier of segmenting its market are out-
weighed by costs in general customer confidence. For example, other customers of the supplier may
become worried if they sense that the supplier will quickly take advantage of any firm-specific
leverage that it can develop. These other customers would probably not, however, be concerned if
the supplier is simply insisting that the debtor pay for old shipments before the supplier delivers
new ones.
A final issue arises in these supplier cases when the supplier, who is owed money for prepeti-
tion deliveries, simply refuses to deal with the debtor whether or not the debtor agrees to make
payments for the unpaid goods. Rarely will a prepetition creditor's refusal to deal not constitute an
attempt, either explicit or implicit, to get paid for prepetition deliveries. If the debtor is willing to
pay cash for postpetition deliveries, that cash is as good as any other customer's cash. Thus, the
supplier would seem to have no reason to refuse to sell to the debtor other than to exercise lever-
age with respect to unpaid prepetition shipments.
It is conceivable, however, that a supplier who refuses to sell to the debtor is motivated by
something other than a desire for payment of prepetition debts. First, the supplier may wish to
refuse delivery to the debtor, even on a cash basis, because the supplier simply dislikes customers
that file bankruptcy. Second, if the supplier's supply of goods or services is limited, it may wish to
allocate them to customers who the supplier believes are likely to be around for future dealings. In
either of these situations, the court should not force the recalcitrant supplier to continue dealing
with the debtor. Since the supplier is not attempting to collect a prepetition debt, the automatic
stay is not implicated at all, and thus there can be no offensive use of the stay. Additionally, courts
have not interpreted § 525's antidiscrimination provisions to apply to private parties, and thus
that section does not provide a basis for forcing the supplier to continue dealing with the debtor,
even on a cash basis. See infra note 152. But see Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Drexel Heritage
Furnishings (In Re Blackwelder Furniture), 7 B.R. 328, 338-39 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1980) (noting
that a substantial question existed as to whether a private supplier's refusal to deal was unlawful
discrimination contrary to "the letter or the policy" of the Code).
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contracts on the cure of prepetition defaults? It could be argued that as
long as a debtor gives adequate assurance of postpetition performance,
the debtor ought to be able to insist on reciprocal postpetition perform-
ance from the nondebtor party. Any obligation that a debtor owed
under the prepetition contract would simply be treated as an unsecured
claim against the debtor's estate. An advantage of this approach is that
the debtor's assumption of an executory contract would not create an
apparent preference to the other contracting party for the debtor's un-
secured prepetition obligations."'
In rejecting such a "non-cure" system of contract assumption, the
Code drafters may have wished to avoid the effect such a regime would
have on the willingness of nondebtor parties to make contracts with
financially struggling entities. If a debtor could file bankruptcy, assume
an existing contract, and cure any existing defaults with the proverbial
ten cents on the dollar, parties would be less likely to enter into con-
tractual relationships with potential bankruptcy candidates."
Alternatively, rather than refusing to deal with debtors on the
brink, nondebtor parties might charge financially unstable companies a
significant premium that reflects the risk inherent in performing the
bargain in full while the debtor offers something much less in return.60
Even under the Code's current system, debtors in bankruptcy can
choose to breach prepetition executory contracts and pay damages in
bankruptcy dollar rates, a risk that by itself creates a disincentive for
nondebtor parties to contract with potential bankrupts.6" Had the Code
drafters created the additional rule that a debtor choosing to assume
the benefits of a contract could simultaneously ignore some of its bur-
dens, the disincentive effects may have crippled troubled companies.
Yet the Code's current rule on contract assumptions leaves an un-
easy sense that the nondebtor party to the contract is receiving a pref-
erence. Preferences are anathema in bankruptcy. Even a novice student
of the Code knows that one of bankruptcy's chief goals is equality of
treatment among creditors.2 But that simple policy statement ignores
58. See Epling, supra note 56, at 193-94 (noting the apparent anomaly of allowing a prepeti-
tion creditor whose contract is assumed by the debtor-in-possession to receive preferred treatment
while a similarly situated prepetition creditor whose contract is rejected becomes a general un-
secured creditor).
59. See Raymond T. Nimmer, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Protecting the Funda-
mental Terms of the Bargain, 54 U. COLO. L. REv. 507, 512-13 (1983).
60. See id. at 513.
61. The power of a debtor-in-possession to "reject" an executory contract has been analo-
gized to the ability of any party, whether in bankruptcy or not, to breach a contract and pay
damages for the breach. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPrCY LAW 108
(1986).
62. See, e.g., Research-Planning, Inc. v. Segal (In re First Capital Mortgage Loan Corp.), 917
F.2d 424, 428 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting "the prime bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution
[Vol. 45:71
1991] OFFENSIVE USES OF THE BANKRUPTCY STAY 85
an important point: upon the debtor's bankruptcy not all creditors are
on an equal footing. At the point of the debtor's bankruptcy, the credi-
tor who possesses an ability to confer some special future benefit on the
debtor is not in the same position as the creditor who has nothing to
offer the debtor.
The Code's drafters recognized this difference in positions among
creditors in the Code's provisions on assumption of executory con-
tracts."3 Perhaps, too, the drafters sensed that a fundamental unfairness
would result if a Chapter 11 debtor were able to insist on further bene-
fits from another party while at the same time failing to honor its own
obligations to that party.6 4 A similar inequity results, however, in cases
that have enabled the debtor to use the stay offensively. Offensive use
of the stay compels performance from the other party while not guaran-
teeing return performance on obligations owed to that party when the
bankruptcy petition was filed.
2. Refusals to Deal and the Necessity Doctrine
The classic refusal-to-deal scenario occurs quite frequently in
Chapter 11 reorganization cases. There are typically three classes of
nondebtor parties whose threats not to deal with the debtor carry some
weight. The first class consists of suppliers similar to Creditor in the
above hypothetical.65 A supplier is likely to be in such a situation for
two reasons: it is often owed money by the debtor for prepetition deliv-
eries on credit, and its products or services may offer the debtor firm-
specific advantages that the debtor could not easily obtain through
other sources.
The debtor's own employees comprise the second class of
nondebtor parties who may be in a position to condition future benefits
to the debtor on cure of prepetition defaults.6 6 Like suppliers, employ-
among creditors of the debtor" (citation omitted & emphasis in original)).
63. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
64. See Nimmer, supra note 59, at 512 (noting that a system in which debtors could assume
executory contracts without curing prepetition defaults would raise "questions of inequity").
65. See supra text accompanying notes 49-53; see, e.g., B&W Enters. v. Goodman Oil Co. (In
re B&W Enters., Inc.), 713 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1983) (rejecting a supplier's attempt to condition
continued business on a Chapter 11 debtor's payment of prepetition claims by holding that the
court has no power to authorize such payments). See generally Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 56,
at 15-16 (discussing cases in which a debtor made prepetition payments to postpetition suppliers).
66. See, e.g., Michigan Bureau of Workers' Disability Compensation v. Chateaugay Corp. (In
re Chateaugay Corp.), 80 B.R. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (allowing the preconfirmation payment of cer-
tain prepetition employee claims); In re Gulf Air, Inc., 112 B.R. 152 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1989) (au-
thorizing the payment of prepetition wages and benefits to employees). But see In re FCX, Inc., 60
B.R. 405 (E.D.N.C. 1986) (denying a Chapter 11 debtor's request to pay its employees for prepeti-
tion wages owed); In re Structurlite Plastics Corp., 86 B.R. 922 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988) (holding
the payment of certain prepetition employee medical claims to be an illegal subordination of re-
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ees of a firm in Chapter 11 will often have the two ingredients that give
rise to an effective refusal to deal: leverage against the debtor in the
form of firm-specific skills not readily available on the open market,
and prepetition wages that were unpaid at the point of filing. Although
an employee already receives a Code-created priority for unpaid prepe-
tition wages, the size of the priority will sometimes be smaller than the
amount of unpaid salary owed to the worker.6 7 Furthermore, the Code's
grant of the employee priority does not assure immediate payment.6 "
Consumer customers are the final group of nondebtor parties some-
times involved in a refusal to deal. 9 Imagine, for example, a major com-
mercial airline filing for relief under Chapter 11. It is almost certain
that many customers of the airline will have purchased tickets for fu-
ture flights prior to the bankruptcy filing.70 Technically, customers
holding tickets at the point of filing are prepetition unsecured credi-
tors.7 Although the customer group may not speak with a single voice,
most customers probably would choose not to fly again with the debtor
airline until the airline honors existing tickets.72
Of the nondebtor parties in these three classes, only suppliers have
maining unsecured creditors); Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 56, at 12-15 (discussing various
cases in which debtors made prepetition payments to employees).
67. Section 507(a)(3) of the Code gives a third priority to prepetition employee wages earned
within 90 days prior to the debtor's bankruptcy filing, but only to the extent of $2000 for each
individual employee. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (1988).
68. See Structurlite, 91 B.R. at 816 (stating that "§ 507 of the Code provides no independent
source of authority for a bankruptcy court to order payment of a pre-petition, unsecured claim: it
merely establishes a system of priority for unsecured claims").
69. See Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 56, at 15-16 (discussing cases allowing payments to
customers).
70. That was the case, for example, when Eastern Airlines filed for bankruptcy. See id. at 15.
71. The Code's expansive definition of "claim" would encompass the right of a customer who
had purchased a ticket prepetition to fly on a flight scheduled postpetition. See 11 U.S.C. §
101(4)(B) (1988) (defining "claim" to include a "right to an equitable remedy for breach of per-
formance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable
remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, se-
cured, or unsecured").
72. Recognizing this reality, the court in Eastern Airlines allowed the Chapter 11 debtor to
permit consumers holding tickets purchased prepetition to use those tickets for postpetition flights
on the airline. See Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 56, at 15. Arguably, a rational customer should
write off the past and choose to fly in the future with the airline offering the cheapest flight, even if
it happens to be the airline that is now the customer's debtor. Thus, if customers acted rationally,
it would not make sense for the airline to honor tickets purchased by customers prepetition. This
argument ignores at least two realities. First, many customers may not be able to simply ignore
past dealings with the airline. A revenge motive may cause these customers to fly with another
airline even when the airline that stiffed them in the past offers the lowest rate. Second, customers
who have been disappointed in the past by a particular airline may have legitimate fears about
whether the airline will treat them similarly in the future. Thus, choosing to honor these custom-
ers' prepetition tickets may inject a feeling of customer confidence that would otherwise be
lacking.
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been direct victims of a debtor's offensive use of the stay. This is hardly
surprising. It is one thing for a bankruptcy court to compel a supplier
to continue doing business with a debtor. It is quite another to force
employees to work or to mandate that consumers fly a particular air-
line. Nevertheless, even with employees and consumers, questions have
arisen as to whether the debtor's selective payment of prepetition
claims amounts to a violation of the automatic stay by the debtor it-
self.7" The automatic stay aside, some courts have concluded that bank-
ruptcy courts simply lack the power to allow a debtor to make selective
payments of prepetition claims.74
Fortunately, a number of courts have wisely allowed the debtor's
judicious use of selective payments to certain unsecured creditors under
a theory known as the "doctrine of necessity."75 The doctrine of neces-
sity evolved from a related doctrine, the necessity of payment rule,
which originated in railroad reorganization cases .7 The necessity of
payment rule, which is still recognized today, allows a reorganizing rail-
road to pay any unsecured prepetition creditors that it determines it
must pay to ensure postpetition survival.77
Courts that permit offensive uses of the stay are, by implication,
refusing to recognize the doctrine of necessity. Nor are all commenta-
73. See, e.g., Crowe & Assocs., Inc. v. Bricklayers and Masons Union Local No. 2, 20 B.R.
225, 227 (E.D. Mich. 1982), aff'd, 713 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1983) (an employer believed that acceding
to its employees' demand to pay prepetition debts to the employees would violate the stay).
74. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Mabey, 832 F.2d 299, 302 (4th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 962 (1988) (holding that the bankruptcy court lacked the discretion to
permit A.H. Robins to establish a fund to make interim payments to prepetition Dalkon Shield
victims); Crowe & Assocs., Inc. v. Bricklayers and Masons Union Local No. 2 (In re Crowe &
Assocs., Inc.), 713 F.2d 211, 216 (6th Cir. 1983) (noting that even if the debtor wished to pay
prepetition employee claims, "the bankruptcy court may not permit it to do so"). See generally
Tabb, supra note 57, at 92-98 (reviewing cases that reject the authority of the court to permit such
prepetition payments).
Section 549 is sometimes cited as authority for the invalidity of such payments. See, e.g.,
B&W Enters., Inc. v. Goodman Oil Co. (In re B&W Enters., Inc.), 713 F.2d 534, 535 (9th Cir.
1983). In effect, § 549 provides that the trustee may avoid postpetition transfers of property of the
estate unless those transfers are authorized either by the Code or by the court. 11 U.S.C. § 549
(1988). The use of § 549 to invalidate such payments, however, avoids the harder question of
whether the court possesses equitable powers under § 105 to allow such payments to advance the
reorganization.
75. See generally Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 56. Courts have used several Code provi-
sions and theories to justify the doctrine of necessity, although the Code does not explicitly au-
thorize use of the doctrine. Some of the mechanisms proposed by courts and commentators tojustify the doctrine of necessity are the following: § 105(a) of the Code allowing the bankruptcy
court to issue "any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the
provisions of this title," 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1988); an analogy to § 365(b)'s rules on assumption of
executory contracts; and the notion that those prepetition creditors getting paid have a "lien-like"
claim which entitles them to payment. Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 56, at 5-10.
76. Eisenberg & Gecker, supra note 56, at 2-5.
77. Id. at 3.
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tors enamored with the necessity concept. Professor Charles Tabb, the
leading expert on the subject of what he terms "emergency preferential
orders," contends that courts, if they recognize the necessity doctrine at
all, should narrowly construe it to cover only those cases in which the
public interest is truly at stake. s
Professor Tabb does not suggest that the stay should force
nondebtor parties to deal with the debtor. Rather, he argues that the
debtor-in-possession should not be allowed to pay certain prepetition
unsecured creditors in full in order to gain some benefit in the future.79
The problem, according to Professor Tabb, is that very early in the
case, prepetition creditors with leverage over the debtor will attempt to
exert pressure by withholding future dealings unless the debtor makes
immediate payment on outstanding prepetition claims.8 0
The debtor's existing management will decide whether to succumb
to the leverage of those creditors, since the Chapter 11 rules allow the
current managers to remain in place unless a trustee is appointed be-
cause of fraud or mismanagement."' Professor Tabb contends that the
managers of a Chapter 11 firm have a perverse incentive to accede to
the demands of unsecured creditors with leverage.8 2 The reason, he
says, is that the managers, who are often stockholders, will lose all hope
of future gain if the company liquidates.83 Only a successful reorganiza-
tion will allow those managers to retain their jobs and realize any value
from their stock. 4
Professor Tabb notes that if the Chapter 11 company is insolvent,
the true owners of the company are the unsecured creditors. Since the
unsecured creditors are the claimants at the margin, they are the "own-
ers in equity" of the firm. Thus, they should be the ones deciding
whether the burden to the firm of paying these particular unsecured
creditors in full is worth the benefit of conducting continued business
with them. According to Professor Tabb, the problem is that these se-
lective payments to prepetition creditors often take place so soon after
the case begins that the unsecured creditors do not have a meaningful
78. Tabb, supra note 57, at 100. In addition to his Emergency Preferential Orders article,
Professor Tabb has written articles discussing both the substantive and procedural issues sur-
rounding cross-collateralization, which is one category of emergency preferential orders. See
Charles J. Tabb, Lender Preference Clauses and the Destruction of Appealability and Finality:
Resolving a Chapter 11 Dilemma, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 109 (1989); Charles J. Tabb, A Critical Reap-
praisal of Cross-Collateralization in Bankruptcy, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 109 (1986).
79. See Tabb, supra note 57, at 75.
80. Id. at 76.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1988).
82. Tabb, supra note 57, at 79.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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opportunity to participate in the decision. 5
Professor Tabb's argument has some merit, but in one sense it goes
too far. The debtor-in-possession will have to make countless decisions
about the postpetition operation of the business.8 6 In all of these deci-
sions, the management's discretion will arguably be tainted by incen-
tives that are skewed toward preserving the business at all costs.
Nevertheless, the Code's drafters believed that the detrimental effects
of the current managers' perverse incentives are, in the aggregate, out-
weighed by some countervailing benefit.8 7 That benefit includes the
avoidance of inevitable transition costs that would result from a sudden
change in management, as well as the retention of firm-specific skills
and knowledge that the existing management embodies.88
As Professor Tabb acknowledges, unsecured creditors have some
protection against the possibility of self-interested decisionmaking by
the managers.1s First, the debtor-in-possession has a fiduciary duty to
protect the interests of the unsecured creditors.90 Second, to the extent
that existing managers make decisions that are ultimately deemed
harmful to the firm, those managers risk ouster through the appoint-
ment of a Chapter 11 trustee.91 Finally, unsecured creditors are given a
formal voice in significant decisions of the debtor-in-possession through
the creditors' committee,92 as well as through the general right of a
85. Id. at 76-78.
86. Unless the court orders otherwise, the debtor-in-possession continues to operate the busi-
ness following the filing of a petition in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1107, 1108 (1988).
87. The legislative history of the Code specifically mentions that one key reason for leaving
the debtor-in-possession in control is that continuation of experienced management will benefit
both debtors and creditors by leading to a greater likelihood of successful reorganization. HOUSE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY LAW REVISION, H.R, REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 233
(1977).
88. The legislative history notes that another advantage of leaving the current management
in place is avoidance of the expense of a trustee. Id.
89. Tabb, supra note 57, at 77-78.
90. See, e.g., Fulton State Bank v. Schipper (In re Schipper), 933 F.2d 513, 515 (7th Cir.
1991) (holding that a debtor-in-possession owes fiduciary duty to unsecured creditors).
91. Section 1104 of the Code provides that a Chapter 11 trustee shall be appointed by the
court, on request of a party in interest, "for cause, including fraud, dishonesty, incompetence, or
gross mismanagement of the affairs of the debtor by current management, either before or after
the commencement of the case," or "if such appointment is in the interests of creditors, any equity
security holders, and other interests of the estate. . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)-(2) (1988). It is
unlikely that a trustee would be appointed quickly enough to avoid the effects of a self-interested
decision by management in the emergency order context. Nevertheless, the threat of a trustee
appointment may help serve as a check on the existing management's perverse incentives with
respect to these early decisions.
92. Section 1102 of the Code provides that the United States trustee shall appoint a commit-
tee of unsecured creditors, which shall ordinarily consist of the persons that hold the seven largest
unsecured claims against the debtor. Id. § 1102(a)(1), (b)(1). The United States trustee may ap-
point additional creditors' committees if the trustee deems it appropriate or, on request of a party
in interest, if such additional committees are necessary to assure adequate representation of credi-
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party in interest to be heard on any issue in a Chapter 11 case. 3
Professor Tabb's complaint that emergency orders allow the selec-
tive payment of prepetition creditors certainly is valid with respect to
the third form of protection that unsecured creditors have against the
danger of existing management's perverse incentives. If unsecured cred-
itors do not receive adequate notice, they will hardly have a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. The objection to lack of notice, however, is
more appropriately met by requiring the most effective notice possible
under the circumstances rather than by instituting a blanket ban on
such payments.9 4
Furthermore, emergency preferential orders will, at a minimum,
have the sanction of the bankruptcy judge, who presumably has some
sense about whether the cost of payments to certain prepetition un-
secured creditors yields a corresponding benefit for the entire group of
creditors.9 5 In refusal-to-deal cases, the decision faced by the debtor-in-
possession is similar to other choices that will routinely confront Chap-
ter 11 managers. In deciding whether to assume or reject an executory
contract, for example, the debtor-in-possession is forced to consider
cost-benefit factors that are analogous to those involved in a refusal-to-
deal case.96
tors or of equity security holders. Id. § 1102(a)(1)-(2). Section 1103 enumerates the powers and
duties of these committees, which include the employment of professionals, consultation with the
debtor-in-possession concerning the administration of the case, investigation of the operation of
the debtor-in-possession's business, participation in the formulation of a plan, and the requesting
of appointment of a Chapter 11 trustee. Id. § 1103(a)-(c).
93. Id. § 1109(b).
94. This is not to suggest that Professor Tabb opposes requiring the most effective notice
possible to unsecured creditors in these situations. Professor Tabb's stated first choice would be a
blanket ban on emergency preferential orders. If such orders are to be made, however, he advo-
cates that the procedural rights of unsecured creditors be strictly protected. Tabb, supra note 57,
at 75.
95. Professor Tabb acknowledges the role of the bankruptcy court itself, as a court of equity,
in protecting the interests of creditors. Id. at 77. He argues, however, that the attempt in the 1978
Reform Act to restrict bankruptcy judges to a judicial, rather than administrative, role "is not and
realistically cannot be honored in practice." Id. at 78.
96. See Andrew, supra note 52, at 890 (emphasizing that the estate's ability to assume the
benefit of executory contract comes only at the cost of the estate's reciprocal performance). Timing
is one distinction between the decision management faces with respect to emergency orders and
the decision it faces with respect to executory contracts. Whereas management must often decide
whether to accept a lender's or supplier's terms within a matter of days or hours in the emergency
order context, § 365(d)(2) gives the debtor-in-possession until the time of confirmation to decide
whether to accept or reject an executory contract. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2). Thus, creditors of the
debtor would almost always have an opportunity to object to what they consider an ill-advised
assumption of an executory contract by the debtor-in-possession. Nevertheless, courts give great
deference to the debtor-in-possession's discretion on the assumption or rejection decision, notwith-
standing the perverse incentives faced by existing management, See Richmond Leasing Co. v. Cap-
ital Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303, 1309-10 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that the test for court approval of
a debtor-in-possession's decision regarding the assumption or rejection of an executory contract is
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First, management must determine how much it will cost to cure
prepetition defaults on the contract. This is akin, in a refusal-to-deal
situation, to the burden of paying the nondebtor party for prepetition
goods or services for which the debtor never paid.9 7 Second, the Chap-
ter 11 debtor with an executory contract will consider the benefits of
assuming the contract. Perhaps there is a set future price in the con-
tract that, relative to the current market, is now favorable to the
debtor."' Moreover, the nondebtor party to the contract may offer
something that the debtor could not easily find elsewhere. The debtor
in a refusal-to-deal case must similarly assess the relative advantage of
pursuing future dealings with the recalcitrant prepetition creditor.
Another situation in which Chapter 11 debtors regularly must
make difficult cost-benefit analyses occurs when a lender insists on
cross-collateralization. The stage is set for cross-collateralization when
an unpaid prepetition lender grants postpetition credit to the debtor.
The lender insists that the debtor's postpetition collateral attach not
only to the new loan, but also to the lender's prepetition unsecured
claims.99 Some courts purport to ban cross-collateralization under any
circumstance,100 but most courts will allow it provided that the parties
adhere to strict notice requirements. 101
When a lender offers to lend on the basis of cross-collateralization,
the Chapter 11 debtor faces a choice similar to that confronting it in
refusal-to-deal and executory contract situations. The debtor-in-posses-
sion must determine whether the postpetition credit terms offered by
this prepetition lender are the most cost-effective terms available. This
determination will be a function of the availability of other postpetition
credit, the nature of other lenders' terms, and the amount of prepeti-
tion indebtedness that the original lender is insisting be cross-
collateralized. 02
merely the business judgment test).
97. Cf. Andrew, supra note 52, at 891 (suggesting that in some cases it might make sense for
the debtor to pay certain prepetition claimants on the theory that the estate would thereby cap-
ture some greater benefit from that claimant).
98. See Westbrook, supra note 53, at 247-49 (proposing an example of this type of
contract).
99. See Tabb, supra note 57, at 81.
100. See, e.g., In re Monach Circuit Indus., Inc., 41 B.R. 859, 861-62 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
101. See, e.g., Burchinal v. Central Washington Bank (In re Adams Apple, Inc.), 829 F.2d
1484, 1490 (9th Cir. 1987) (dicta); In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 115 B.R. 34, 39 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1990).
102. On the surface, it might seem that the debtor-in-possession has no incentive to avoid
giving whatever collateral the postpetition lender demands since the encumbrance of collateral
would appear to hurt only the debtor's other creditors and not the debtor's shareholders or man-
agement. This view, however, ignores the fact that both management and shareholders have a valid
desire to keep the company's collateral unencumbered to the extent possible because the com-
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The cross-collateralization situation is distinct from the refusal-to-
deal case in that even courts that ban cross-collateralization will not
force the lender to extend credit on other terms. Bankruptcy seems to
have a sacrosanct tenet that courts should never force creditors to ex-
tend new credit to a bankrupt. Courts will not enforce specific prepeti-
tion contractual promises to lend, even if the debtor-in-possession has
cured all prepetition obligations owed to that lender.10 3
Some courts are less reluctant to force nondebtor parties to con-
tinue supplying goods or services to the debtor at normal cost.10 ' Such
nondebtor parties arguably suffer less harm than a lender forced to ex-
tend new credit. 0 5 Yet being stripped of legitimate leverage is a form of
injury, as the Code's provision on executory contracts implicitly recog-
nizes. Indeed, as noted earlier, these decisions create the odd result that
the creditor with a contractual duty to deal further with the debtor may
end up in a better position than the creditor who lacks such a duty.
3. Individual Debtors
On the surface at least, the typical refusal-to-deal case involving an
individual debtor seems analytically similar to the cases involving
Chapter 11 corporations. Imagine, for example, that Jane Debtor re-
ceives medical services from a private health clinic. She receives the
services on credit, files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, and has the clinic's
debt discharged along with those debts owed to several other prepeti-
tion creditors."0 6
A few months later, Jane goes back to the clinic and seeks medical
treatment. The clinic advises Jane that it will not treat her until she
satisfies the clinic's discharged debt. Jane protests and offers cash in
advance for the treatment she seeks, but the clinic credit manager will
not relent. Jane goes to court and, alleging violation of the stay, gets an
injunction forcing the clinic to do business with her on a cash basis.
One distinction between this case and those involving Chapter 11
pany's ability to obtain additional credit may depend on the existence of property to pledge as
collateral.
103. Section 365 of the Code provides that the debtor-in-possession may not assume or as-
sign any executo'y contract of the debtor if the contract is one "to make a loan, or extend other
debt financing or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor." 11 U.S.C. §
365(c)(2) (1988).
104. See, e.g., Sportfame of Ohio, Inc. v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. (In re Sportfame of
Ohio, Inc.), 40 B.R. 47 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984); Ike Kempner & Bros., Inc. v. U.S. Shoe Corp. (In
re Ike Kempner & Bros.), 4 B.R. 31 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1980).
105. See, e.g., Sportfame, 40 B.R. at 53 (finding that the nondebtor party "has made no
showing and made no arguments that it would suffer any harm by being required to accept cash
for selling goods to plaintiff and turning a profit").
106. The facts in this example are based loosely on those involved in the case of Olson v.
McFarland Clinic, P.C. (In re Olson), 38 B.R. 515 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984).
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corporations is that here the stay that is allegedly violated is the
postdischarge stay rather than the automatic stay.107 Analytically, a
more significant difference is that the executory contract assumption
model, which is useful in the corporate setting, does not really fit the
individual case.
Suppose that Jane had an executory contract with the medical
clinic requiring it to provide her with medical services for some period
of time, with payment due shortly after each visit. If Jane had the
power to assume that executory contract, she would first have to cure
her prepetition defaults by paying the clinic in full for the prior ser-
vices.108 If allowed to use the stay offensively, Jane would thereby have
a greater right to force continued service from a clinic that did not owe
her a contractual obligation than from a clinic that did. Thus, if Jane
had the power to assume executory contracts, her offensive use of the
stay against the clinic would be inconsistent with the burden/benefit
linkage set down in the Code's executory contracts section.
Unlike a corporate debtor-in-possession in a Chapter 11 case, how-
ever, Jane as an individual does not have the ability to assume her own
executory contracts in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.0 9 The rule prohibiting
individuals from assuming executory contracts stems from the funda-
mental difference between individual and corporate bankruptcies.
When a corporation files for bankruptcy, the bankruptcy estate is the
corporation. There is no entity other than the estate itself. When an
individual files for bankruptcy, on the other hand, the bankruptcy es-
tate is separate and distinct from the living, breathing human being
that filed the petition." 0
In a Chapter 7 case a trustee is appointed to administer the es-
tate."' The trustee's chief task is to convert the assets of the estate to
cash and then distribute the cash to the debtor's creditors." 2 Pursuant
to this aim, the Chapter 7 trustee in an individual case may choose to
107. As noted earlier, the automatic stay ends when the court grants a discharge, and is
replaced by the postdischarge stay. See supra text accompanying notes 18-22.
108. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A) (1988) (providing that a trustee must cure defaults in order to
assume an executory contract).
109. See infra text accompanying notes 110-13.
110. See JACKSON, supra note 61, at 90 (noting this distinction between individuals and cor-
porations in the context of what constitutes property of the estate); cf. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1988)
(providing that property of the estate includes proceeds or profits "from property of the estate,
except such as are earnings from services performed by an individual debtor after the commence-
ment of the case").
111. 11 U.S.C. § 704 (1988); see also § 705(b) (allowing the creditor's committee to consult
with the trustee in the administration of the estate).
112. Section 704 of the Code provides that the Chapter 7 trustee shall "collect and reduce to
money the property of the estate for which such trustee serves, and close such estate as expedi-
tiously as is compatible with the best interests of parties in interest." Id. § 704(1).
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assume executory contracts to which the bankrupt was a party at the
point of filing.11
Thus, in Jane's case, the fact that she would receive a net benefit
from the trustee's assumption of her medical services contract would
not influence the trustee's decision about whether to assume the con-
tract. A Chapter 7 trustee will assume an executory contract only when
the contract offers some benefit that the debtor's creditor group can
enjoy. The trustee can realize that benefit for the estate by assuming
the contract and then assigning it to a third party for cash, thus al-
lowing easy distribution to Jane's claimants.114 Given the limited role of
contract assumption in individual Chapter 7 cases, Jane's trustee would
have no interest in assuming a medical services contract when the as-
sumption would benefit only Jane.
If the executory contract model is not useful in consumer cases, are
offensive uses of the stay by individual debtors like Jane therefore ana-
lytically unobjectionable? To answer that question in the negative, one
need look no further than the Code's reaffirmation section. That sec-
tion, which applies to situations in which the debtor agrees to make an
otherwise dischargeable debt contractually enforceable, is the concep-
tual home for the burden/benefit linkage in consumer cases. 1 5
The role of reaffirmation in consumer bankruptcies has been a con-
troversial issue. The pendulum has swung variously from enforcing
reaffirmations with no consideration and no requirement of court ap-
proval, to allowing reaffirmations only with the bankruptcy court's ap-
proval, to the current middle position embraced by the Code allowing a
reaffirmation as long as either the bankruptcy judge or the debtor's
attorney deems it in the debtor's best interest."6
At first glance, it seems doubtful that a reaffirmation would ever
make sense for an individual debtor. But the desirability of reaffirma-
tion by an individual debtor can be understood by recalling the burden/
benefit choice that faces a Chapter 11 corporation seeking to assume an
executory contract. Like their corporate analogues, individual debtors
will reaffirm debts whenever the benefits that the debtor will gain from
reaffirmation exceed the costs of reaffirmation. The quintessential reaf-
113. See id.'§ 365(a) (permitting the trustee to assume or reject any executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor); id. § 103(a) (providing that the rules of Chapters 1, 3, and 5 of the
Code apply to cases under Chapters 7, 11, 12, or 13).
114. Section 365(f) of the Code gives the trustee the general power to assign assumed con-
tracts as long as the contract assignee provides adequate assurance of future performance. Id. §
365(f).
115. See id. § 524(c) (containing requirements for the enforceability of reaffirmation
agreements).
116. See Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHio ST.
L.J. 1047, 1073-75 (1987).
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firmation case involves a debtor who owes a debt secured by collateral
that the debtor would like to keep. 117
Courts and legislators have long been suspicious of reaffirmations,
mainly because so many ill-advised debtors have succumbed to pressure
to sign agreements offering no discernible benefit to the debtor.1'8 Nev-
ertheless, Congress recognized that occasionally the consumer debtor
might sensibly choose to revive an obligation that the debtor could have
had discharged. 1
Let us return to the case of Jane Debtor and the medical clinic.
Whether or not Jane has an executory contract with the clinic ulti-
mately will not matter. In either case, Jane could seek a reaffirmation of
her debt to the clinic as a means of ensuring postdischarge service from
the clinic. The real question raised in the offensive stay arena, however,
is whether Jane should have to resort to reaffirmation in order to secure
whatever unique benefits the clinic can offer her following discharge.
As noted above, the Code allows reaffirmations because of an un-
derlying recognition that it occasionally makes sense for a debtor to
purchase products or services from a creditor at the cost of selectively
waiving its discharge. Given this reality, it would seem anomalous to
deny the medical clinic the ability to use whatever leverage it had
through its unique appeal to Jane, while at the same time condoning
the ability of other creditors to use their leverage to effect reaffirma-
tions of prepetition debts. An interpretation of the stay that would en-
able Jane to force the clinic to do business with her, however, would be
a strong disincentive for such clinics to extend credit to the financially
struggling Janes of the world. Moreover, those on the brink of bank-
ruptcy are arguably the most in need of the discretionary credit that
providers of consumer goods and services can offer.
The offensive use of the stay is especially pervasive in the reaffir-
117. See, e.g., In re McGrann, 6 B.R. 612 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980) (approving the reaffirmation
of a debt secured by motor vehicles since the vehicles were necessary for transportation to work).
118. See Rendleman, supra note 28, at 729-30 (explaining that reaffirmations were a common
form by which debtors waived discharge prior to the enactment of the Code); cf. In re Long, 3 B.R.
656 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980) (refusing to allow the debtor to reaffirm a $1300 dischargeable debt to
her employer on the grounds that there would be no benefit to debtor in reaffirming).
119. Professor Rendleman suggests that the reaffirmation compromise in the Code reflects
the theory that a bankrupt's moral obligation to repay a creditor remains even after discharge. It
would have been a better choice, he says, for Congress to ban reaffirmations completely. Rendle-
man, supra note 28, at 752-53. That view, however, ignores the many reasons unrelated to moral
obligation that a debtor may have for wanting to reaffirm. Professor Howard, for example, lists five
reasons why a debtor might wish to reaffirm a discharged debt, only the last of which is morally
based: to avoid repossession of collateral; to protect a codebtor who is not in bankruptcy; to secure
postpetition credit from the creditor to whom the reaffirmation is made; to avoid criminal prosecu-
tion or incarceration for a previous conviction, typically on a bad-check charge; and, finally, for
reasons of moral satisfaction. See Howard, supra note 116, at 1072-73.
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mation area. Some courts have denied creditors the ability to even pro-
pose reaffirmation arrangements for the debtor in which future benefits
are offered. 120 For example, imagine that a credit-card issuer to whom
Jane Debtor owed prepetition debts wrote Jane's attorney a letter, with
a copy to Jane. The letter, in nonthreatening language, advised that if
Jane wished to retain her credit card she would have to reaffirm those
prepetition debts on the card that would otherwise be dischargeable.
Some courts facing this type of situation have held that the creditor's
proposal of such a reaffirmation offer is an act to collect a prepetition
debt and therefore violates the stay.'21 This approach may be appropri-
ate if the creditor proposing the reaffirmation agreement has nothing to
offer the debtor in the future other than the moral satisfaction of pay-
ing off creditors. But it is less defensible when the creditor has a deal
for the debtor that might be worth taking.
A rule that permits only debtor-initiated reaffirmations would
bring potential disadvantages to consumer debtors and little discernible
benefit."22 Yet such a rule would result from an interpretation of the
stay that forbids creditors from conditioning future benefits to debtors
on assumption of past burdens. This interpretation of the stay would
leave the task of discovering positive reaffirmation arrangements either
to the debtor, who may be ignorant of the reaffirmation option, or to
the debtor's attorney, who may do little more for the debtor than file
the appropriate court papers. Thus, the debtor will never discover some
advantageous deals because of the effective gag rule that an offensive
view of the stay imposes on creditors who have future benefits to give.
120. See Olson v. McFarland Clinic, P.C. (In re Olson), 38 B.R. 515 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984)
(prohibiting a medical clinic from offering future medical services on the condition that the debtor
pay for prepetition services); Green v. National Cash Register Co. CI Corp. Sys. (In re Green), 15
B.R. 75 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981) (refusing to allow a creditor to offer the debtor postpetition credit
on the condition that the debtor reaffirm prepetition debts owed to the same creditor); In re Ste-
phens, 2 B.R. 365 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980) (same).
121. See Olson, 38 B.R. at 516-18; Green, 15 B.R. at 78; Stephens, 2 B.R. at 366. But see
Brown v. Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union, 851 F.2d 81, 84-86 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding
no stay violation when a credit union sent a letter to a Chapter 7 debtor advising her that if she
wished future services from the credit union, she must reaffirm the prepetition debt).
122. Professor Howard suggests that § 362(a)(6) should not prohibit creditors from acceding
to debtor-initiated requests for reaffirmation, but should prevent creditors from approaching a
debtor for possible reaffirmation. Howard, supra note 116, at 1073 n.174. This view has support in
a Senate committee report on the 1984 Bankruptcy Code Amendments: "Creditors can no longer
independently contact debtors to encourage them to reaffirm debts because such contact is prohib-
ited by the Code... . Reaffirmations obtained presently that are subsequently denied by a bank-
ruptcy court are, in fact, only voluntary reaffirmations." SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, OMNIBUS
BANKRUPTCY IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1983, S. REP. No. 65, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1983). Through
empirical work, Professors Teresa Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay Westbrook found that in
practice creditors regularly seek out debtors to initiate possible reaffirmations. TERESA A. SULLIVAN
ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 281 n.12 (1989) (stating that "[m]ost creditors who get reaf-
firmations ask for them when the debtor shows up for the section 341 hearing").
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The apparent attraction of restricting reaffirmation agreements to
those initiated by the debtor is that the debtor would be less likely to
fall prey to reaffirmations that are not in the debtor's best interest.
That concern, however, rings hollow given the detailed substantive and
procedural Code requirements that any reaffirmation agreement must
currently meet. Under the existing reaffirmation rules, either the
debtor's attorney or the judge is responsible for any enforceable reaffir-
mation agreement that is not truly in the debtor's best interest. 2 '
A refusal to permit consumer debtors to use the automatic stay of-
fensively would not necessarily lead to a rash of letters from creditors
seeking reaffirmation agreements. If the creditor cannot demonstrate to
the court that the proposed reaffirmation offer has a potential benefit to
the debtor that might justify the debtor's cost of reaffirmation, then a
finding of stay violation would be appropriate.
Few creditors, however, could meet this standard. Obviously the se-
cured creditor would qualify as a party that can offer the debtor a
worthwhile deal if the value of the collateral relative to the unpaid debt
is high enough.'24 But so might a credit-card issuer whose consideration
for the reaffirmation is a new credit card, a device whose value in to-
day's market goes well beyond its mere credit limit.125 Furthermore, the
terms under which a recently discharged debtor could obtain a new
card on the open market might make the old card issuer's reaffirmation
deal worth taking.
4. Utility Cases
One additional analytical wrinkle must be dealt with in refusal-to-
deal cases. As discussed previously, the executory contract and reaffir-
123. Section 524(c) contains detailed prerequisites to the enforceability of a reaffirmation
agreement. First, the agreement must be made prior to the grant of discharge. 11 U.S.C. §
524(c)(1). Second, the agreement must contain a clear and conspicuous statement advising the
debtor that she may rescind the agreement at any time prior to discharge or 60 days after the
agreement is filed with the court, whichever is later. Id. § 524(c)(2). Third, the agreement must be
filed with the court and, if the debtor is represented by an attorney, the attorney must file an
affidavit stating that the reaffirmation "represents a fully informed and voluntary agreement by
the debtor" and "does not impose an undue hardship on the debtor or a dependent of the debtor."
Id. § 524(c)(3)(A)-(B). If the debtor is not represented by an attorney, then the court itself must
determine that the reaffirmation does not impose an undue hardship and is in the best interest of
the debtor. Id. § 524(c)(6).
124. It may occasionally make sense for a debtor to reaffirm a secured debt to an under-
secured creditor. For example, an individual may attach idiosyncratic value to a car used for collat-
eral that would not be reflected in the car's market value. Furthermore, a debtor who reaffirms a
secured debt and keeps the car avoids the transaction cost and uncertainty of entering the market
to purchase a different car following the bankruptcy.
125. For example, credit cards are often necessary for ordering goods or services over the
phone, for renting automobiles, or for securing hotel reservations.
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mation provisions of the Code implicitly sanction creditors' ability to
exercise leverage that stems from the debtor's desire for future bene-
fits.12 In contrast, the Code denies utilities the ability to use the power-
ful leverage they possess to ensure payment of otherwise dischargeable
prepetition debts.12 7
Under Section 366 of the Code, no utility is allowed to discontinue
or refuse service on the basis of a debtor's prepetition defaults to the
utility. " ' The utility is entitled to adequate assurance of the debtor's
future performance, but the utility will become just another unsecured
creditor with respect to any prepetition services for which the debtor
never paid.129 This rule is a departure from pre-Code case law, which
regularly allowed utilities to withhold postpetition service from the
debtor until the debtor satisfied prepetition debts to the utility that
had been discharged as part of the debtor's bankruptcy. 30
It is perhaps too easy to justify this exception to the Code's general
philosophy of burden/benefit linkage. An obvious distinction is that
utilities are monopolies, and as such give debtors little choice but to
accede to their demands. 3' The problem with this distinction is that
many nonutilities, or even nonformal monopolies, have monopoly-like
leverage over a particular debtor. 132
126. See supra parts III.A.1-3.
127. See In re Monroe Well Serv., Inc., 83 B.R. 317 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding that if
the debtor assumed a three-year service agreement with the utility, it would have to cure prepeti-
tion defaults; if it rejected, the utility would have to continue service anyway on terms comparable
to those given a new customer); Kiriluk v. Chester Water Auth. (In re Kiriluk), 76 B.R. 979, 982
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (noting a striking difference between 3§ 365(b) and 366, since the former
requires the debtor's cure as a prerequisite for the assumption of future benefits, whereas the
latter does not); In re Gehrke, 57 B.R. 97, 97-98 (Bankr. D. Or. 1985) (applying § 366 rather than §
365 when the electric co-op association had a practical monopoly on electrical service in the region
and deeming § 366 an exception to § 365).
128. 11 U.S.C. § 366(a). At least one federal court of appeals has held that § 366 requires a
utility to restore service terminated prepetition if the debtor so requests. Whittaker v. Philadel-
phia Electric Co. (In re Whittaker), 882 F.2d 791 (3rd Cir. 1989).
129. Section 366(b) gives the trustee or the debtor 20 days from the filing of the petition to
furnish adequate assurance of future performance to the utility. 11 U.S.C. § 366(b) (1988).
130. See, e.g., Ryan v. Ohio Edison Co., 611 F.2d 1170 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that the pre-
Code postdischarge stay only prevents creditors from pursuing discharged claims through formal
court proceedings and does not prevent utilities from exercising their leverage in order to collect
by threatening to shut off power or actually shutting it off); Slenderella Sys., Inc. v. Pacific Tel. &
Tel. Co., 286 F.2d 488 (2d Cir. 1961). But see South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Simon (In re
Fountainebleau Hotel Corp.), 508 F.2d 1056 (5th Cir. 1975) (rejecting a utility's use of state law
leverage to compel the payment of prepetition claims).
131. The legislative history of § 366 says that it is intended to apply to "utilities that have
some special position with respect to the debtor, such as an electric company, gas supplier, or
telephone company that is a monopoly in the area so that the debtor cannot easily obtain compa-
rable service from another utility." HousE COMM. ON THE JuDIcIARY, BANKRUPTCY LAw REVISION,
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 350 (1977).
132. For example, in Jane Debtor's case, perhaps the medical clinic in question is the only
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If offensive uses of the stay are permissible in cases involving either
monopolies or creditors with monopoly-like leverage over the debtor,
then a rather illogical line must be drawn. Under this model, only a
creditor whose leverage is not powerful is allowed to use it. Thus, credi-
tors face an odd balancing act when debtors attempt to use the stay
offensively. On the one hand, creditors hope that the unique future
benefits they offer the debtor will be significant enough to give them
meaningful leverage. On the other hand, the creditors have to contend
in court that their leverage against the debtor was not so powerful as to
offer the debtor no real choice but to accede to their insistence that the
debtor assume prepetition burdens owed to that creditor. 133
There is a second, more subtle, way to distinguish utilities from
other nondebtor parties who offer the debtor desirable future benefits.
As mentioned above, one cost of allowing offensive use of the stay is
that nondebtors will be less likely to extend credit to financially strug-
gling parties who are not yet in bankruptcy.3 4 Thus, an offensive stay
creates a disincentive effect that arguably would not occur with utilities
because the regulatory environment in which utilities operate severely
limits their discretion to choose customers. 35
Thus, whereas a private party who senses that a customer is head-
ing for imminent insolvency could either refuse credit altogether or
grant credit only on stricter terms, a utility typically cannot engage in
this type of differential customer treatment. 36 The utility can respond
to its differential bankruptcy treatment, however, by simply giving less
credit flexibility to all customers. 3 7 This would enable the utility to
one within 100 miles of Jane's residence. Cf. Sportfame of Ohio, Inc. v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co.
(In re Sportfame of Ohio, Inc.), 40 B.R. 47, 50 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) (noting that the supplier's
products, "due to advertising and name brand identification, were both in demand and often irre-
placeable in the minds of debtor's customers"). It is not uncommon in refusal-to-deal cases for the
nondebtor party to exercise something approaching monopoly-like leverage over the debtor.
133. The illogical nature of this sort of line-drawing was apparently lost on the Third Circuit
in Brown v. Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union. In that case, the court noted that the
credit union's conditional refusal to deal with the debtor did not violate the stay because "[t]he
conveniences which the credit union supplies the debtor-direct deposit and automatic payment of
life insurance premiums-do not rise to such a level that the threat of their withdrawal is necessa-
rily coercive." Brown v. Pennsylvania State Employees Credit Union, 851 F.2d 81, 85 (3d Cir.
1988).
134. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61, 119-20.
135. See generally Roger D. Colton, Heightening the Burden of Proof in Utility Shutoff
Cases Involving Allegations of Fraud, 33 HOWARD L.J. 137, 138-143 (1990) (describing the contours
of a public utility's "common law duty to serve," which includes the "obligation to provide service
to all who pay for it").
136. Id.
137. See Veryl V. Miles, Adequate Assurance of Payment Under Section 366 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code: A Term for Interpretive Flexibility or Judicial Confusion?, 20 AKRON L. REv. 715,
738-39 (1987) (noting that the amount of a utility's state-approved security deposit will typically
reflect "the maximum risk of loss that the utility would incur if they had to terminate service to a
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limit the size of any unsecured claim in bankruptcy.
For analytical purposes, perhaps the most honest way to handle the
Code's section on utilities is not to attempt justifiable distinctions of
the provision that make it fit neatly within a Code that generally hon-
ors creditor leverage existing outside of bankruptcy. Rather, a better
approach might simply limit the section to its terms and consider it for
what it is-a fairly narrow and, in the end, fairly insignificant exception
to the Code's usual adherence to a burden/benefit linkage. 138
B. License Cases
1. The Classic Fact Scenarios
Government license cases have generated an increasing amount of
controversy in the corporate area.139 The typical situation involves a
debtor business that has a liquor license. 140 Under state law, either re-
newal or transfer of the license is statutorily conditioned on the
debtor's payment of state taxes. The debtor is delinquent on its state
taxes and files for bankruptcy. Once in bankruptcy, either the debtor
wishes to have its license renewed notwithstanding the delinquent state
taxes,' or the estate's representative wishes to transfer the license to
some third party without first paying the taxes. 42
Offensive use of the stay comes into play in the license cases when
the court characterizes as a stay violation the state licensor's refusal to
renew the license or allow the transfer pending payment of prepetition
taxes. 43 Once again, the debtor or the trustee is attempting to secure
customer pursuant to the state rules").
138. Arguably, the existence of § 366 implies that offensive uses of the stay in other contexts
must be impermissible. If Congress intended § 362(a) to prohibit conditional refusals to deal, then
the specific rule in § 366 prohibiting such refusals by utilities would be unnecessary.
139. See, e.g., Bavely v. United States Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Terwilliger's Catering
Plus, Inc.), 911 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1990) (permitting a Chapter 7 debtor to transfer a liquor license
free of state law restrictions that condition transfer on the payment of state taxes), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 2815 (1991); California v. Farmers Markets, Inc. (In re Farmers Markets, Inc.), 792 F.2d
1400 (9th Cir. 1986) (allowing a state liquor board to condition the transfer of the debtor's liquor
license on the debtor's payment of delinquent prepetition state taxes); In re Feature Homes, Inc.,
116 B.R. 731 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1990) (allowing a state to refuse the revival of a corporate license to
the debtor until payment of delinquent prepetition state taxes); Elsinore Shore Assocs. v. Casino
Control Comm'n (In re Elsinore Shore Assocs.), 66 B.R. 723 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986) (refusing to
allow the state casino control commission to condition the renewal of the debtor's casino license on
the payment of prepetition license fees and taxes).
140. See, e.g., Aegean Fare, Inc. v. Licensing Bd. (In re Aegean Fare, Inc.), 35 B.R. 923
(Bankr. D. Mass 1983); Anderson v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n (In re Anderson), 15 B.R. 399
(Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1981).
141. See, e.g., Aegean Fare, 35 B.R. at 924-25; Anderson, 15 B.R. at 400.
142. See, e.g., In re Hoffman, 65 B.R. 985 (D.R.I. 1986); Nu-Process Brake Engineers, Inc. v.
Benton (In re Nu-Process Brake Engineers, Inc.), 119 B.R. 700 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1990).
143. See, e.g., In re Nejberger, 120 B.R. 21, 23 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (holding that the refusal of a
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further benefits from a nondebtor party without first assuming prepeti-
tion burdens owed to that same party. An approach consistent with the
burden/benefit linkage running throughout the Code would allow the
licensor to condition the renewal or transferability of the license on the
debtor's payment of delinquent prepetition taxes.
For individual debtors, the most common fact patterns involve
driver's licenses. In the typical situation, the state has some sort of fi-
nancial responsibility act under which an individual's retention of a
driver's license following an accident is conditioned on the driver either
paying any tort judgment arising from the accident or posting proof of
financial responsibility.14 4 In the problematic situation, a driver files for
bankruptcy, then attempts to regain the license despite having dis-
charged the tort judgment that led to the license suspension. License
cases involving individuals differ from corporate license cases in that
the party from whom the debtor wants future benefits (the state) is not
the party to whom the past burden is owed (the tort victim). As the
next subpart demonstrates, this distinction may prove significant for
purposes of defining a reasonable scope for the Code's antidiscrimina-
tion section.145
2. The Role of Section 525
It is not surprising that the fact patterns that give rise to offensive
uses of the Code's stay provisions also provoke improper uses of the
Code's antidiscrimination section.1 46 Section 525 of the Code provides
that a governmental unit may not deny a license or discriminate against
a person with respect to a grant solely because the person has become a
debtor or had a debt discharged under the bankruptcy laws.147 The leg-
islative history of Section 525 indicates that Congress intended it to
state liquor board to renew a liquor license until the debtor paid delinquent taxes violated § 362);
Hoffman, 65 B.R. at 989 (same); Nu-Process Brake Engineers, 119 B.R. at 702-03 (same); Aegean
Fare, 35 B.R. at 927-28 (holding that the refusal to renew a liquor license pending payment of
prepetition taxes violates § 362).
144. See, e.g., Norton v. Tennessee Dep't of Safety (In re Norton), 867 F.2d 313 (6th Cir.
1989) (involving a state statute providing that every driver found financially irresponsible was re-
quired to pay a $65 fee, maintain insurance, and pass a new driver's test); Duffey v. Dollison, 734
F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1984) (relying on a state statute providing that anyone failing to satisfy an auto-
related tort judgment within 30 days must post proof of financial responsibility).
145. See infra part II.B.2.
146. See, e.g., Elsinore Shore Assocs., 66 B.R. at 733, 741 (holding that a state casino control
commission's insistence on payment of prepetition license fees and taxes as a condition for a casino
license renewal violated both § 362 and § 525); Anderson, 15 B.R. at 400 (holding that the refusal
to renew a liquor license for the failure to pay prepetition taxes violated § 525).
147. See 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (1988). In 1984 Congress amended § 525 to add subsection (b),
which prohibits discrimination by private employers against an employee "solely because" of the
employee's bankruptcy or failure to pay a debt that was discharged in bankruptcy. Id. § 525(b).
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codify the result in Perez v. CampbeU1.148
In Perez, a pre-Code decision, the Supreme Court held that a state
could not refuse to renew a driver's license for nonpayment of an auto-
related tort judgment that had been discharged in bankruptcy.149
Courts have struggled to define the appropriate scope of Section 525.150
One reason for this struggle is that formulating a workable definition of
Section 525 forces courts to determine the precise functional signifi-
cance to a debtor of having a debt discharged in bankruptcy.
What does it mean for a debtor to have a debt discharged in bank-
ruptcy? Section 524 and its legislative history indicate that the dis-
charge means, at a minimum, that creditors of discharged debts cannot
take actions, judicial or informal, to collect those debts. 1 1 Section 525's
antidiscrimination provision apparently goes further, but it is unclear
how much Congress intended it to reduce other collateral consequences
of discharging debts in bankruptcy.
A very broad interpretation of Section 525 would give additional
content to the notion of discharge: having a debt discharged would be
equivalent, for all purposes enumerated in Section 525(a), to the debtor
paying the debt in full.15
2
148. 402 U.S. 637 (1971). The legislative history of § 525 provides that the section "codifies
the result of Perez v. Campbell, which held that a State would frustrate the Congressional policy of
a fresh start for a debtor if it were permitted to refuse to renew a drivers license because a tort
judgment resulting from an automobile accident had been unpaid as a result of a discharge in
bankruptcy" (citation omitted). House CoMm ON THE JUDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY LAW REVISION, H.R.
REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 366-67 (1977).
149. 402 U.S. at 656.
150. Compare Spruce Ltd. Partnership v. Lutz (In re Lutz), 82 B.R. 699, 705 (Bankr. M.D.
Pa. 1988) (holding that § 525 does not mean that a debtor can assume an executory contract
without curing the prepetition default under § 365) with Sudler v. Chester Hous. Auth. (In re
Sudler), 71 B.R. 780, 787 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (holding that § 525 "overrides" § 365 so as to
allow a debtor to assume benefits in executory contracts without curing prepetition defaults).
151. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
152. Pre-Code cases held that discharge of a debt in bankruptcy was not equivalent to pay-
ment of the discharged debt. See, e.g., McClendon v. Kenin, 385 P.2d 615, 616 (Or. 1963) (stating
that "discharge is not a payment or extinguishment of the debt; it is simply a bar to all future legal
proceedings for the enforcement of the discharged debt" (citation omitted)). The legislative history
of § 524 says that, "[iun effect, the discharge extinguishes the debt, and creditors may not attempt
to avoid that." H.R. Ran. No. 595 at 366. That statement, however, does not imply that discharge is
equivalent to "paid for all purposes." If the § 524 discharge amounted to payment of the debt for
all purposes, § 525's antidiscrimination rules would be unnecessary. An even broader interpreta-
tion of § 525 would extend the same payment-in-full concept to prohibit discrimination by private
parties. Some commentators have advocated this extension, see Douglass G. Boshkoff, Private Par-
ties and Bankruptcy-Based Discrimination, 62 IND. L.J. 159, 175-79 (1987); see also Rendleman,
supra note 28, at 741-45. Supporting the argument for extending § 525 to private parties is lan-
guage in that section's legislative history which says that "[t]he enumeration of various forms of
discrimination against former bankrupts is not intended to permit other forms of discrimination."
H.R. Ran. No. 595 at 367. The legislative history also notes that § 525 as enacted is not as broad as
an earlier version of the provision that would have prohibited discrimination by private parties. Id.
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However, even a narrower interpretation of Section 525 that makes
discharge equivalent to payment in full only for government creditors
in license cases would represent a large and significant exception to the
burden/benefit theme that pervades the Code. Such an interpretation
would also create a conflict between the executory contracts section of
the Code and the antidiscrimination section in cases in which a govern-
mental unit has a specific executory contract to provide the debtor with
a license or grant.
The conflict arises because Section 365(b), standing alone, would
require the debtor party to cure prepetition defaults in order to assume
an executory contract with the government. Because a broad reading of
Section 525 would make the debtor's discharge of prepetition obliga-
tions owed to the government equivalent to actual payment of those
debts, the debtor's need to cure as a condition of contract assumption
under Section 365(b) would be obviated.
Courts confronted with this tension between the Code's executory
contracts section and its antidiscrimination provision have gone both
ways on the issue. In Sudler v. Chester Housing Authority (In re
Sudler)153 the debtor was a public housing tenant who was behind in
her rent when she filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The city housing au-
thority, which operated the public housing project, argued that, under
Section 365, if the debtor wished to assume her lease, she first had to
cure prepetition defaults. The court rejected this argument and held
that Section 525 is an exception to the general rule in Section 365.11"
Apparently one factor leading to rejection of the earlier version was that the credit industry feared
it would be unable to consider a prospective customer's past bankruptcy in deciding whether to
extend credit. See Boshkoff, supra, at 165. But very few courts have been willing to read § 525(a)
to cover situations other than those enumerated. See, e.g., In re Draughon Training Institute, Inc.,
119 B.R. 927, 933 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1990) (holding that private discriminatory conduct was not
prohibited by § 525); Barbee v. First Va. Bank-Colonial (In re Barbee), 14 B.R. 733, 735-36
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981) (same); In re Coachlight Dinner Theatres of Nanuet, Inc., 8 B.R. 657, 658-
59 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same); cf. Wilson v. Harris Trust & Sav. Bank, 777 F.2d 1246, 1249
(7th Cir. 1985) (stating that "Congress would not have added section 525(b) if it thought private
employers were already barred from discriminating against debtors under § 525"). But see Olson v.
McFarland Clinic, P.C. (In re Olson), 38 B.R. 515, 519 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1984) (stating in dicta
that "recent decisions have strongly suggested that § 525 should be construed to apply to private
entities"); Blackwelder Furniture Co. v. Drexel-Heritage Furnishings, Inc. (In re Blackwelder Fur-
niture Co.), 7 B.R. 328, 338-39 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1980) (holding that a substantial question existed
as to whether a private supplier's refusal to deal was unlawful discrimination contrary to "the
letter or the policy" of the Code); Boshkoff, supra, at 168 (criticizing the Seventh Circuit's statu-
tory reasoning as "quite unsatisfactory").
153. 71 B.R. 780 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987).
154. Id. at 787. The court's assumption that an individual in a Chapter 7 case had the ability
to assume a lease was interesting. Section 365 gives a trustee the power to assume executory con-
tracts or unexpired leases, and a trustee is always appointed in a Chapter 7 case. If the individual
debtor in Sudler wanted to assume the lease for her own personal benefit, the appropriate vehicle
to do so probably would have been § 524's provision on reaffirmation. See supra text accompany-
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Thus, the court said that the public housing authority could not pre-
vent the debtor from continuing to rent her unit on the basis of a prior
rent obligation discharged in bankruptcy.
155
The court in Spruce Limited Partnership v. Lutz (In re Lutz) 5
reached the opposite conclusion. In Lutz a landlord sought to evict a
tenant because of the tenant's failure to pay prepetition rent. The court
assumed arguendo that this landlord was a governmental unit, and
noted that Section 525 did not make discharge equivalent to payment
in full. 157 The court stated that "[a] debtor's right to require another
party to continue to perform its obligations under an executory contract
is governed by the terms of that contract.' ' 58 Thus, explained the court,
when a landlord elects to terminate a lease because of prepetition de-
faults, that act is not, by itself, discriminatory. s' e
Whereas many bankruptcy courts have read Section 525(a) to
mean that discharge equals payment in the circumstances enumerated
by the subsection, 60 most federal courts of appeals have seemed un-
comfortable with such an expansive interpretation of Section 525(a)'s
effect. In Goldrich v. New York State Higher Educucation Services
Corp. (In re Goldrich)"' the Second Circuit determined that Section
525 did not prevent the state from refusing to extend new student loans
to applicants who had discharged previous student loans. The court em-
phasized that the statute in question did not discriminate against bank-
rupts because-it applied to anyone who failed to repay previous student
loans, not just those who had previous loans discharged in bank-
ruptcy.6 2 In so holding, the Second Circuit was refusing to treat dis-
ing notes 108-19.
155. Sudler, 71 B.R. at 786-87; see also Hiser v. Blue Cross (In re St. Mary Hosp.), 89 B.R.
503, 505 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988) (stating that "the strong public policy of 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) over-
rides the potential requirement of 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)" (citation omitted)), afl'd, 931 F.2d 51 (3d
Cir. 1991).
156. 82 B.R. 699 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1988).
157. Id. at 704 (stating that although discharge relieves debtors of personal liability on
missed payments, nothing in the Code or legislative history "indicate[s] that the discharge was
intended to cure defaults in leases or other executory contracts and thereby reinstate them").
158. Id.
159. Id. at 705.
160. Section 525(a) makes it unlawful for i governmental unit to deny, revoke, suspend, or
refuse to renew a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant to, condition such a
grant to, discriminate with respect to such a grant against, deny employment to, terminate the
employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment against a debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 525(a)
(1988).
161. 771 F.2d 28 (2d Cir. 1985).
162. Id. at 31 (explaining that "the language of [the New York state law] indicates that it
applies uniformly to all students who fail to repay student loans, whether they declare bankruptcy
or not"). The Goldrich court also noted that the legislative history of § 525 indicates that the
section does not prohibit consideration of other factors, such as future financial responsibility, "as
long as that consideration was done in a nondiscriminatory fashion." Id. at 31; see also Elter v.
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charge in a Section 525 case as full repayment of the discharged debt.
In the Sixth Circuit case of Duffey v. Dollison,16 3 an Ohio statute
required a driver who failed to pay an automobile-related tort judgment
within thirty days to post proof of financial responsibility in order to
get a driver's license back. The debtor in Duffey incurred such a judg-
ment, failed to pay it, and then had it discharged in bankruptcy. When
the state insisted that the debtor post proof of financial responsibility
notwithstanding the discharge, the debtor complained that such a re-
quirement violated Section 525.164 The debtor wanted the court to treat
the discharge of his tort judgment as if it were payment of the debt for
purposes of the license statute. The court found no discrimination in
the application of the Ohio statute to this debtor because the statute
applied to all drivers with unpaid debts, not just those who had dis-
charged them."'5
The Sixth Circuit used the same logic five years later in Norton v.
Tennessee Department of Safety (In re Norton), ss which involved a
Tennessee statute requiring a reissuance fee to be paid by drivers whose
licenses had been suspended for failure to pay tort judgments. The
debtor in Norton complained that the debt that prompted the suspen-
sion of his license was now discharged. The court, however, found no
discrimination because all drivers falling to pay tort judgments, not just
bankrupts, had to pay a reinstatement fee.16 7
While these narrow constructions of Section 525 are consistent with
the Code's general linkage of burdens with benefits, the distinctions
drawn by both the Second Circuit and the Sixth Circuit are hard to
reconcile with the result in Perez. Using the logic of the Second and
Sixth Circuits, the state rule struck down in Perez, that drivers had to
pay auto-related tort judgments in order to regain their licenses, cer-
tainly applied to anyone who failed to pay a judgment, not just to bank-
rupts. Yet the apparent even-handedness of the rule in Perez was not
enough to save it from being struck down as inconsistent with bank-
ruptcy's fresh start principles.
Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp. (In re Elter), 95 B.R. 618 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1989) (permitting a
state agency to deny new educational loans to students who had prior educational loans discharged
in bankruptcy).
163. 734 F.2d 265 (6th Cir. 1984).
164. Id. at 267.
165. Id. at 273.
166. 867 F.2d 313 (6th Cir. 1989).
167. Id. at 317; see also In re Calendar, 99 B.R. 378, 380 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1989) (upholding
a state credit union's policy of refusing services to members who have had a credit union loan
discharged in bankruptcy because "it is not only those employees of the Postal Service who cause
loss to the Credit Union by filing bankruptcy who are deprived of the services of the Credit Union,
but employees who cause loss by any means...").
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Given Section 525's explicit reliance on the Perez holding, perhaps
it is artificial to attempt an interpretation of that section other than
"discharge equals full payment" for the cases enumerated. The Second
and Sixth Circuits attempted to find an interpretation of Section 525
that lay somewhere between the specific holding of Perez and an equat-
ing of discharge with full payment in all government license or grant
cases. Unfortunately, this attempt to draw a meaningful line ultimately
created distinctions analytically devoid of meaning. Noted bankruptcy
scholar Dean Thomas Jackson could find no narrow construction of
Section 525 that was consistent with Perez and concluded that Section
525's codification of Perez is, as a normative matter, simply wrong. 168
Dean Jackson analogizes the rights of an automobile tort creditor
under these state statutes to those of a lien holder. He suggests that
because ordinary liens pass through bankruptcy unless specifically
avoided, the lien-like leverage that an automobile tort creditor enjoys in
these states should similarly pass through bankruptcy unaffected by the
discharge. 6
9
Theoretically, Dean Jackson is probably right. Perez stripped away
the leverage in bankruptcy that state law had given tort creditors, lev-
erage that should have been effective both inside and outside of bank-
ruptcy. As Dean Jackson and his frequent coauthor, Professor Douglas
Baird, have explained in great detail, there are inherent dangers in us-
ing bankruptcy as a place to change relative creditor entitlements that
exist outside of bankruptcy.3. 0
Perhaps there is a way to define a role for Section 525 that is con-
sistent with Perez, but nevertheless does not equate discharge with pay-
ment in full in all government license or grant cases. Ideally, debtors
would not lose out on government grants or other government benefits
solely because of the stigma attached to filing bankruptcy. This type of
discrimination occurred in In re Son-Shine Grading, Inc.,' for exam-
ple, when the state of North Carolina refused to deal with a Chapter 11
debtor solely because the debtor was in bankruptcy. Similarly, in
Marine Electric Railway Products Division v. New York City Transit
Authority (In re Marine Electric Railway Products Division)'7 2 the
court held that the New York City Transit Authority could not reject a
168. JACKSON, supra note 61, at 266-69.
169. Id. at 267.
170. See BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 56, at 42; Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson,
Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Interests: A Comment on
Adequate Protection of Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 51 U. CHL L. REv. 97, 121 (1984) (con-
cluding that bankruptcy's concern ought to be with increasing the overall size of the pie, not with
changing the size of the pieces).
171. 27 B.R. 693 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1983).
172. 17 B.R. 845 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
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debtor's bid on a public contract solely because the debtor was a Chap-
ter 11 debtor in possession.
In these pure discrimination cases, the party charged with discrimi-
nation was not owed a prepetition claim by the debtor.173 On the other
hand, it seems much more defensible when the government conditions
future benefits to a debtor on payment of an obligation owed to it by
the debtor.
There is a meaningful way to distinguish the Perez scenario from
the situation in which the government is asking for payment before pro-
viding or renewing a debtor's liquor license. In Perez the state statute
serves as a collection device for third-party automobile tort victims. In
the typical liquor license case there is no such third-party beneficiary.
The government's insistence on payment of taxes means only that the
party to whom the debtor looks for further benefit is not forced to give
such benefit while foregoing collection of past obligations.
Thus, a 1referable interpretation of Section 525 would forbid the
following two categories of conduct by a governmental unit: pure dis-
crimination by the government based solely on the debtor's bankruptcy
filing without regard to any particular discharged debt; and a condition-
ing of benefits that has the effect of creating a collection device for a
third party. Interpreted this way, Section 525 would have independent
significance in combatting true bankruptcy discrimination. Further, it
would codify the holding in Perez without making discharge by the
debtor tantamount to full payment for all purposes when a government
licensor or grantor is also a creditor.
The proposed reading of Section 525 would lead to the result that
the Sixth Circuit sought in the Duffey and Norton cases without having
to rely on reasoning that would essentially overrule Perez. Under the
state statutes in Duffey and. Norton, any driver who failed to pay a
discharged auto-related tort judgment would have to either pay the dis-
charged judgment or purchase insurance as proof of financial responsi-
bility in order to keep a license. In almost every case the discharged
173. See Exquisito Servs., Inc. v. United States (In re Exquisito Servs., Inc.), 823 F.2d 151
(5th Cir. 1987) (prohibiting discrimination based solely on a government contract bidder's filing of
Chapter 11; no prepetition debt of the government was involved). The dissent in Exquisito claimed
that the majority read § 525 too liberally in prohibiting the Air Force from refusing to renew its
food service contract with the debtor in possession. Id. at 155 (Jolly, J., dissenting). The dissent
said that § 525 should apply only when the government is acting as sovereign in license and grant
cases, and not when the government is acting like a private party conditioning its grant of a benefit
on the receipt of a mutual benefit. Id. (Jolly, J., dissenting). The problem with this distinction is
that in many license cases, the government conditions the grant of a benefit, such as a liquor
license, on the receipt of a mutual benefit, such as the payment of state taxes. Thus, in license or
grant cases and cases in which the government acts like a private party, the government has a
benefit to give that is linked with a specific burden owed to the government.
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debtor will choose to purchase the insurance rather than pay the dis-
charged debt to the third party.17 4
In Perez the state statute required a debtor to pay the third party's
discharged debt. Thus, the statute provided the third-party creditor
with an effective collection device. In contrast, application of the state
statute in Duffey and Norton would rarely result in a collection device
for third-party tort creditors.
Similarly, the Goldrich court could have reached the result it
wanted without using a rationale inconsistent with Perez.17  To distin-
guish its facts from those in Perez, the Second Circuit could have noted
that whereas the statute in Perez created a collection device for third
parties, the New York statute merely gave leverage to the very govern-
mental unit from whom the debtor sought future benefits.
3. A Property of the Estate View of Corporate License Cases
The license renewal and transfer cases can be analyzed from an-
other perspective, one that involves neither the automatic stay nor the
antidiscrimination provisions of the Code. In the typical liquor license
case, a different way to justify the state's ability to condition the li-
cense's transfer on payment of prepetition taxes is to argue, as some
courts and commentators have done,1 6 that the property right repre-
sented by the liquor license comes into bankruptcy subject to any valid
conditions on its enjoyment that existed outside of bankruptcy.
This particular analysis has significant support in case law,' al-
174. There are a number of reasons for this. First, the cost of paying the discharged tort
judgment is typically large, given that the tort judgment often prompted the debtor to file bank-
ruptcy in the first place. Second, the tort judgment would have to be paid in a lump sum, whereas
the cost of insurance typically is amortized over the course of the year. Third, if the debtor chooses
to purchase insurance, at least the debtor is getting some future benefit for her money-namely,
the benefit of having insurance. Paying the discharged tort judgment, however, fails to give the
debtor any independent benefit beyond requalifying for her driver's license.
175. In addition to justifying the New York statute by saying it applied to all applicants who
had defaulted on previous student loans, the Goldrich court noted another distinction between the
case before it and those covered by § 525. According to the court, the legislative history of § 525
indicates that even parties covered by the section could take a prior bankruptcy into account in
deciding whether to extend credit. Goldrich v. New York State Higher Educ. Servs. Corp. (In re
Goldrich), 771 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1985). This credit versus no credit dichotomy seems to distin-
guish Goldrich from Perez, but it does not distinguish Duffey or Norton from Perez, since neither
of the Sixth Circuit cases involved the government in the position of lender.
176. See, e.g., California v. Farmers Markets, Inc. (In re Farmers Markets), 792 F.2d 1400,
1403 (9th Cir. 1986); JACKSON, supra note 61, at 97.
177. See Calvert v. Bongards Creameries (In re Schauer), 835 F.2d 1222, 1225 (8th Cir. 1987)
(recognizing the validity in bankruptcy of state law transfer restrictions on margin certificates is-
sued by a farm cooperative to the debtor); Artus v. Alaska Dep't of Labor (In re Anchorage Int'l
Inn), 718 F.2d 1446, 1451-52 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Professional Sales Corp. (In re Pro-
fessional Sales Corp.), 56 B.R. 753, 764 (N.D. M. 1985) (noting, when a Chapter 11 debtor at-
tempted to enjoin the revocation of an interim status permit of the Environmental Protection
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though its conclusions are far from universally accepted. 178 Arguably,
the "conditional property" doctrine is just another manifestation of the
general bankruptcy theme that a debtor's right to insist on future bene-
fits ought to be conditioned on the debtor's assumption of preexisting
burdens owed to the party from whom future benefits are sought."'
The classic pre-Code Supreme Court case that formulated this doc-
trine is Board of Trade v. Johnson.1s0 In Johnson the debtor owned a
seat on the Chicago Board of Trade. The debtor's contract with the
Board provided that the debtor could transfer the seat to a third party
only after paying in full any creditors on the Board of Trade.
The trustee of the debtor's estate argued that the conditional re-
striction on transfer of the seat should not prevent the seat from being
classified as property of the estate.'"' The Supreme Court's holding en-
abled the trustee to win the battle but lose the war: the Court said that
the seat did indeed become property of the estate, but was subject to
the restrictions on transfer that existed outside of bankruptcy. 82 In this
case the debt owed to the debtor's Board of Trade creditors exceeded
the amount for which the seat could be sold on the open market. Thus,
although the seat became property of the estate, it ultimately had no
value to the estate. 83
The conditional property analysis applies only to cases involving
corporate licenses and not to cases involving individual driver's licenses.
Although a corporate license qualifies as property of the estate, an indi-
vidual driver's license is excluded from the estate as a nontransferable,
purely personal right of the individual.184 In liquor license cases, courts
have applied various combinations of the stay, antidiscrimination, and
property approaches to justify the state's ability to condition transfer of
Agency, that "the interim status is encumbered with statutory conditions that limit its value and
are therefore an incident of any property right enjoyed with such status").
178. See Bavely v. United States Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Terwilliger's Catering Plus,
Inc.), 911 F.2d 1168, 1177 (6th Cir. 1990) (declining to follow the Ninth Circuit in Farmers Market
"to the extent they reach a contrary result"); see also In re Kick-Off, Inc., 82 B.R. 648, 650 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1987) (describing the Ninth Circuit's reasoning as "an interesting exercise in metaphysics
that has a superficial appeal," but "[w]e are not persuaded").
179. Dean Jackson makes this point eloquently when he analogizes the treatment of execu-
tory contracts in bankruptcy to the conditional property analysis set down by the Supreme Court
in the Board of Trade case. See JACKSON, supra note 61, at 107-08.
180. 264 U.S. 1 (1924).
181. Id. at 3-4.
182. Id. at 15.
183. The debtor in this case owed more than $60,000 to members of the Board of Trade. The
seat itself, however, was worth only $10,500 at the time he filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 7-8.
184. See ELIZABETH WAREN & JAY L. WESTBRooK, THE LAw OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 204
(2d ed. 1991) (reasoning that a driver's license "represents a very valuable legal right that is of no
value to anyone but the debtor," and thus "cannot be property of the estate").
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the license on payment of prepetition taxes. 18 5 Thus, it is not surprising
that courts have failed to reach a consensus in resolving this recurring
issue.
C. Transcript Cases
Transcript cases merit separate treatment in a discussion of offen-
sive uses of the stay for at least two reasons: first, there are many of
these cases; and second, these cases demonstrate the arbitrary distinc-
tions that courts must draw when they broadly interpret the Code's an-
tidiscrimination provisions. Transcript cases frequently arose prior to
the enactment of the Code, 86 and they continue to arise today in large
numbers. 817
In transcript cases the basic facts are almost always the same. An
ex-student from a college or university still owes money on loans that
the student took out while in school. The ex-student files bankruptcy,
and then needs a copy of his transcript from the school to which he
owes the student loans. The school, however, has a policy of refusing to
release transcripts to students whose student loans are in default, so it
refuses to give the student the transcript.
The many cases in this area can be classified along two dimensions:
state versus private schools, and dischargeable versus nondischargeable
student loans. Thus, there are four possible combinations of these two
variables: state school makes dischargeable loan,18  private school
makes dischargeable loan, 89 state school makes nondischargeable
loan, 1 0 and private school makes nondischargeable loan.' 9 '
Debtors seeking transcripts have used both the theory that the
school violated the stay 9 2 and the theory that the school violated the
185. See Bavely, 911 F.2d at 1171-72 (stating that a license transfer was allowed through §
541 analysis only); Elsinore Shore Assocs. v. Casino Control Comm'n (In re Elsinore Shore As-
socs.), 66 B.R. 723 (Bankr. D.NJ. 1986) (holding that the refusal to renew a casino license violated
both §§ 362 and 525); Aegean Fare, Inc. v. Licensing Bd. (In re Aegean Fare), 35 B.R. 923 (Bankr.
D. Mass. 1983) (finding a violation of § 362 only); Anderson v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n (In
re Anderson), 15 B.R. 399 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1981) (finding a violation of § 525 only).
186. See, e.g., Girardier v. Webster College, 563 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1977); Handsome v.
Rutgers Univ., 445 F. Supp. 1362 (D.N.J. 1978).
187. See, e.g., Johnson v. Edinboro State College, 728 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1984); California
State Univ., Fresno v. Gustafson (In re Gustafson), 111 B.R. 282 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990).
188. See, e.g., In re Reese, 38 B.R. 681 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984).
189. See, e.g., Parraway v. Andrews Univ. (In re Parraway), 50 B.R. 316 (W.D. Mich. 1984).
190. See, e.g., Johnson, 728 F.2d 163.
191. Cf. In re Ware, 9 B.R. 24 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981) (refusing to allow a private college to
withhold a transcript to induce payment of a loan that was not yet discharged in the Chapter 13
plan proposing a 20% payment to unsecured creditors).
192. See, e.g., Lanford v. Macalester College (In re Lanford), 10 B.R. 132 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1981).
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Code's antidiscrimination section.""3 Courts have tended to be more
sympathetic to a school's policy of withholding transcripts when the
debtor's student loan is nondischargeable, presumably because the non-
dischargeable character of the loan removes any possible argument that
discharge equals payment. 194
The inconsistency between the result courts reach in cases involv-
ing state schools and the result courts reach in cases involving private
schools highlights one of the problems with interpreting Section 525 to
mean that discharge equals full payment to governmental units in li-
cense cases. Because Section 525 applies only to governmental units,
courts are generally unwilling to extend its protection to the debtor's
dealings with private parties.195 Thus, a court reading Section 525 to
equate discharge with payment by the debtor would find no discrimina-
tion when a private school withholds a transcript but would find a Sec-
tion 525 violation when a public school is the withholding institution.
Such a distinction between the treatment of a state school and that
of a private school has little justification in principle. However, this ar-
bitrary distinction could be avoided completely with the narrower read-
193. See, e.g., In re Heath, 3 B.R. 351 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980) (holding that a state college's
refusal to release a transcript to a student who had a dischargeable student loan violated both §
525 and § 362).
194. See, e.g., Johnson, 728 F.2d at 164-65 (holding that a state college's refusal to release a
transcript to a student who had a nondischargeable loan debt did not violate § 525). But see Gus-
tafson, 111 B.R. at 288 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990) (holding that a state college's refusal to release a
transcript prior to the determination of dischargeability violated both § 362 and § 525). The dis-
sent in Gustafson analogized the college's position in the transcript case to the position of a bank
in the freeze cases. Id. at 290 (Russell, J., dissenting); see infra part IM.D. (discussing administra-
tive freeze cases). The dissent noted that if the university is forced to turn over the transcripts
prior to a determination of dischargeability, it has lost its leverage even if the student loan debt
turns out to be nondischargeable. 111 B.R. at 290 (Russell, J., dissenting). On the other hand, if
the university refuses to turn over the transcript prior to a determination of the student loan's
dischargeability, it has violated the automatic stay. Id. The dissent argued that the university
"must not be put to such a Hobson's choice until the court has actually determined the dis-
chargeability of the debt." Id.
Similarly, in Howren v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. (In re Howren), 10 B.R. 303
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1980), the court held that a university violated the stay by withholding a tran-
script from a former student prior to a determination of the dischargeability of the student's edu-
cational loan debt. Id. at 305-06. The university unsuccessfully argued that it had a lien on the
transcript to secure repayment of the student loan debt. Id. at 305. One commentator noted that
the transcript in Howren could not have been collateral, since the university had failed to take the
proper steps under Article 9 of the U.C.C. Anthony P. Lawthier, Comment, Student Loans and
the Withholding of Transcripts Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 30 U. KAN. L. REv.
265, 273-75 (1982). That argument, however, misses the larger point that, notwithstanding any
Article 9 interest the university has in the transcript under state law, the university possesses a
special form of leverage that it could use under state law to insure repayment of the student loan.
The commentator fails to explain why such leverage, which is valid outside of bankruptcy, should
not similarly be valid inside of bankruptcy.
195. See supra note 152.
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ing of Section 525 proposed earlier.196 The proposed interpretation
would ban only government actions that amounted to pure discrimina-
tion on the basis of bankruptcy or that created, as did Perez, a collec-
tion device for third parties. When a state school withholds a transcript
because of an unpaid student loan, it is not discriminating against ex-
students simply because they filed bankruptcy. Nor is the state school
creating a collection device for a private third party. Rather, the pur-
pose of the refusal is to cause the student to repay the student loan, for
which the ultimate guarantor is the same government that conferred
the benefit in the first place.
Of course, if a court perceives the school's transcript withholding as
a violation of the stay, any state-private distinction under Section 525
is moot. A 1990 amendment to the Code makes it likely that fewer
courts will allow debtors to use the stay offensively to obtain the benefit
of transcripts without assuming corresponding burdens owed to the
school. 197 The Code has never permitted Chapter 7 debtors to discharge
student loans, 8 and a 1990 amendment now makes such loans nondis-
chargeable in Chapter 13 cases as well. 99 Thus, only those courts that
allow a debtor to use the stay offensively for nondischargeable debts
will continue to give the debtor a potent weapon against a former
school.
One of the most insightful opinions in the student transcript area
was written in the Eighth Circuit case of Girardier v. Webster Col-
lege.200 Ironically, most courts discount the holding in Girardier be-
cause it was a pre-Code case governed by a postdischarge stay that
prohibited only formal court actions to collect discharged debts.201
Thus, the majority's holding that a college's refusal to release a tran-
script did not violate the stay was premised in part on the narrower
scope of the pre-Code postdischarge stay.2 °2
In a thoughtful concurrence, Judge Bright 203 agreed with the ma-
jority's holding, but not with its rationale. The majority had noted that
if Webster College were a public school, the result would have to be
196. Conversely, this arbitrary distinction could be avoided by interpreting § 525 very
broadly to provide that discharge equals payment in full for both public and private parties.
197. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 3007(b), 104 Stat.
1416 (1990).
198. See Howard, supra note 116, at 1086-87.
199. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1328(a)(2) (West Supp. 1991) (making educational loans as defined by §
523(a)(8) a new exception to the Chapter 13 discharge).
200. 563 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1977).
201. See, e.g., Virginia Union Univ. v. Parham (In re Parham), 56 B.R. 531, 532-33 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1986) (stating that the Girardier holding "has been legislatively overruled" by the Code's
broadened stay).
202. Girardier, 563 F.2d at 1272.
203. Id. at 1277 (Bright, J., concurring).
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different in order to comport with Perez. Judge Bright began by point-
ing out the anomaly created by the majority's holding: that "a state
school is obligated to furnish transcripts to a bankrupt former student
but, until he or she pays the discharged educational loan, a private
school is not. 2 0 4
Judge Bright then explained why a college, public or private,
should be able to withhold a transcript without violating the postdis-
charge stay. First, he said, Webster College in no way coerced the debt-
ors to pay discharged debts. Rather, "Webster College merely declined
to confer any additional benefits upon the debtors by furnishing tran-
scripts of their grades for the unpaid educational courses."20 5 Then,
echoing the theme of burden/benefit linkage that underlies bankruptcy
law, Judge Bright said that no college, public or private, should have to
enhance educational benefits that it has already given by issuing a tran-
script when it has not been paid for its services.20 6
Judge Bright's point that no party should be forced to enhance
benefits it has already given until the debtor first assumes prepetition
burdens is an argument that continues to have force even subsequent to
the enactment of the Code. The Code's broadened postdischarge stay in
no way mandates that nondebtor parties such as Webster College must
give continuing benefits to a debtor who has yet to pay its prepetition
obligations.20 7 As Judge Bright simply stated toward the end of his con-
currence, "[t]he equities here lie with the college. 20 8
D. Administrative Freeze Cases
The administrative freeze cases provide a fruitful area of offensive
stay use by debtors. 2 e These cases have resulted from some imprecise
204. Id. (Bright, J., concurring).
205. Id. at 1278 (Bright, J., concurring).
206. Id. But see Rendleman, supra note 28, at 746-50. Professor Rendleman argues that a
transcript is like a driver's license in that both issuing entities are monopolies, and in that credi-
tors should not be allowed to hold either as ransom to pay discharged debts. According to Profes-
sor Rendleman, state bar associations denying law licenses on the basis of bankruptcy present an
analogous problem. Id. Both the law license and driver's license situations, however, can be distin-
guished from the transcript case. The law license case is clearly distinguishable because the state
bar associations that would seek to deny admission to applicants who have filed bankruptcy are
not prepetition creditors. As explained earlier, the driver's license case is also distinguishable from
the transcript case because while the driver's license statutes create collection devices for third
parties, in the transcript case the creditor is merely attempting to link the grant of its own future
benefit to the debtor's assumption of a preexisting burden owed to the creditor.
207. See supra notes 20-37 and accompanying text.
208. Girardier, 563 F.2d at 1278 (Bright, J., concurring).
209. See, e.g., First Conn. Small Business Inv. Co. v. Bank of Boston Conn. (In re First
Conn. Small Business Inv. Co.), 118 B.R. 179 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990); Homan v. Kemba Cincinnati
Credit Union (In re Homan), 116 B.R. 595 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990).
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Code drafting, as well as from the tendency of some judges to read
Code provisions in isolation.
The basic facts in the administrative freeze scenario are straight-
forward. The debtor, either consumer or corporate, will typically have a
demand account with a bank. The bank, in turn, will have a loan to the
debtor that is currently outstanding. Shortly after the debtor files
bankruptcy, the debtor comes into the bank and demands that the
bank return all of the money in the demand account. The bank, realiz-
ing that the debtor owes money to it, refuses to release the funds to the
debtor, a right that the bank will almost invariably enjoy under rele-
vant state law.21 0
Many courts have held that such a refusal by the bank violates the
stay.211 These holdings provide an egregious example of courts allowing
debtors to use the stay offensively. In the refusal-to-deal cases, courts
at least make debtors pay in full for any benefits that the nondebtor
party confers upon them postpetition.1 2 In the typical freeze case, how-
ever, the bank is effectively told that it must give up money in which it
has an interest without receiving adequate protection of its interest in
the unpaid loan.
Full appreciation of the freeze cases requires examination of a
number of Code provisions that are difficult to reconcile. First, there is
Section 553, which generally sanctions a creditor's. exercise of any state-
law setoff right that it may have against the debtor at the point of fil-ing213 Section 553 is consistent with the burden/benefit linkage found
elsewhere in the Code: it prohibits the debtor from insisting on pay-
ment in one-hundred-cent dollars from a nondebtor party while relegat-
ing the nondebtor party to collection of ten-cent "bankruptcy dollars"
on the loan that the debtor owes to it. If the debtor wants a bene-
fit-payment in full of the nondebtor's obligation to it-the debtor
must first satisfy burdens that it owes to the nondebtor party.
In apparent contrast to Section 553's corroboration of the Code's
general benefit/burden linkage stands Section 362(a)(7), which says
210. See BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 56, at 512 (noting that "[w]hen Debtor fails to repay
its loan to Bank, Bank is generally entitled, under State law, to 'set-off' the monies 'in' the check-
ing account against the obligation that Debtor owes Bank").
211. See, e.g., First Conn. Small Business Inv. Co. v. Bank of Boston Conn. (In re First
Conn. Small Business Inv. Co.), 118 B.R. 179 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1990); Homan v. Kemba Cincinnati
Credit Union (In re Homan), 116 B.R. 595 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990).
212. See, e.g., Sportfame of Ohio, Inc. v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. (In re Sportfame of
Ohio, Inc.), 40 B.R. 47, 53 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) (requiring the debtor to pay cash in advance or
upon receipt of goods delivered postpetition).
213. 11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1988). The exceptions listed in § 553(a) to the general right of setoff
include situations in which the creditor party purchases a claim against the debtor within 90 days
of the bankruptcy in order to enhance its setoff right, id. § 553(a)(2), and situations in which a
creditor bank compels the debtor to deposit money in the debtor's bank account, id. § 553(a)(3).
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that the bankruptcy filing stays any act of nondebtor parties to set off
prepetition debts that the debtor owes the nondebtor party.2 14 There is
a sensible way to construe Section 362(a)(7) so that it will not conflict
with Section 553, but most courts have failed to consider it. This non-
conflicting approach would view Section 362(a)(7) as a formal check on
efforts by nondebtor parties to effect setoffs when the state-law setoff
requirements are not met. Most states, for example, require true mutu-
ality of parties for a valid setoff, so that, for example, a bank could not
set off from the debtor's account a debt owed to the bank by a subsidi-
ary corporation of the debtor.215 Section 362(a)(7) may simply be a
mechanism, then, to ensure that the bankruptcy court has an opportu-
nity to examine the validity of a bank's setoff rights before those rights
are finally effected.21
Two other Code provisions support a limited view of the role of
Section 362(a)(7) in freeze cases. Section 363 states that debtors may
not use "cash collateral" unless either the party with an interest in it
consents or the court, after notice and a hearing, authorizes such use.211
If the court authorizes the debtor's use of cash collateral, it must, upon
request, give adequate protection to the nondebtor party with an inter-
est in the cash collateral.218 In the freeze cases, the money in the
debtor's account would qualify as cash collateral under the definition
given in Section 363.219 As noted above, that section permits debtors to
214. Id. § 362(a)(7); see also id. § 362(a)(3) (barring any act "to exercise control over prop-
erty of the estate"). Courts have not construed § 362(a)(7) to stay a creditor's exercise of recoup-
ment, which is related to a setoff. While both setoffs and recoupments involve the cancelling of
debts between a debtor and a creditor, setoffs may involve claims arising out of separate transac-
tions whereas recoupments involve only claims arising out of the same transaction. See United
States v. Midwest Serv. and Supply Co. (In re Midwest Serv. and Supply Co.), 44 B.R. 262, 265-66
(D. Utah 1983); In re Yonkers Hamilton Sanitarium Inc., 22 B.R. 427, 432 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982);
cf. California Canners and Growers v. Military Distribs. of Va., Inc. (In re Cal. Canners and Grow-
ers), 62 B.R. 18, 21 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1986) (specifically rejecting recoupment theory when one
transaction occurs prepetition and the other occurs postpetition).
215. See, e.g., Davidovich v. Welton (In re Davidovich), 901 F.2d 1533, 1537 (10th Cir. 1990)
(holding that the mutuality requirement for setoff mandates that debts involved be between the
same parties standing in the same capacity).
216. Many jurisdictions hold that for a setoff to be definitively affected, at least three steps
are required of the creditor: the decision to exercise setoff; some affirmative action to accomplish
the setoff; and some record evidencing that the creditor has exercised the right of setoff. See
United States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1976); Baker v. National
City Bank of Cleveland, 511 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1975); Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 533 F. Supp. 905,
925 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The requirement of an overt act for setoff implies that the mere withholding
of funds in these jurisdictions does not by itself amount to a setoff.
217. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2)(A)-(B) (1988). It is also noteworthy that § 506(a) of the Code
specifically characterizes a secured claim as any valid right to setoff that a creditor has at the point
of the debtor's filing. Id. § 506(a).
218. Id. § 363(e).
219. Id. § 363(a) (defining cash collateral as cash or cash equivalents in which "the estate
and an entity other than the estate have an interest").
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use that money only to the extent that a court gives the bank appropri-
ate protection for its interest in the money.
The other Code provision that supports a more limited view of Sec-
tion 362(a)(7) is Section 542(b).220 That provision requires an entity
that owes a debt to the debtor to pay the debt over to the trustee "ex-
cept to the extent that such debt may be offset under [S]ection 553. ''221
Any type of account that the debtor has at a bank would simply be a
debt that the bank owes to the debtor.22 Under Section 542(b), then, a
bank with a right of setoff need not turn over to the trustee any of the
debtor's funds in its possession. The language in that Section also sug-
gests that the drafters of the Code recognized a difference between the
mere withholding of funds and the act of setoff.22 3
In addition to the statutory provisions, there is a powerful com-
mon-sense argument against permitting offensive use of the stay in
freeze cases. Consider a situation in which a dispute arises between two
parties as to whether the bank has a valid right of setoff when the
debtor demands funds from the bank. Suppose there is a rule that
forces the bank to give up the money, but it later becomes evident that
the bank was correct in asserting a right to setoff. At that point, there is
a reasonable likelihood that the bank will be unable to realize its setoff
rights because the debtor has already spent the money.224
On the other hand, imagine a rule that prohibits the debtor's offen-
sive use of the stay. That is, suppose that the bank is permitted to
freeze the account and take the issue to court within a reasonable time
period to determine the parties' relative rights to the funds.225 Under
this rule, if the bank's claim of setoff rights proved invalid, the estate
would have a solvent party from whom to collect not only the funds in
the account, but also any damages caused by the bank's invalid claim of
setoff rights.
220. Id. § 542(b).
221. Id.
222. See, e.g., Walter v. National City Bank of Cleveland, 330 N.E.2d 425, 427 (Ohio 1975)
(explaining that in setoff cases "a bank stands in the relationship of debtor to its depositor").
223. See Kenney's Franchise Corp. v. Central Fidelity Bank, NA, 22 B.R. 747, 748 (W.D. Va.
1982) (reasoning that use of the phrase "may be offset" in § 542(b) "clearly contemplates that the
setoff right has not been exercised" and that "Congress has recognized a significant distinction
between the withholding of payment and the exercise of the setoff right" (citation omitted)).
224. Cf. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust and Sav. Ass'n v. Edgins (In re Edgins), 36 B.R. 480, 484
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984) (criticizing cases that consider administrative freezes to be a stay violation,
noting that a bank's attempt to regain the money later "will, all too often, be an attempt to lock
the barn door after the horse has been stolen").
225. The court in Crispell v. Landmark Bank (In re Crispell), 73 B.R. 375 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
1987), for example, gave the creditor seven days from the point at which it froze debtor's account
either to turn the funds over to the trustee or to request the court to allow it to exercise its right of
setoff under § 553. Id. at 379-80.
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In some jurisdictions, the bank's risk in acceding to the debtor's
request for the account money may be even greater than the usual dan-
ger that the debtor may dissipate the funds. Some courts go so far as to
hold that a bank's postpetition release of funds in the debtor's account
amounts to a waiver of the bank's right to setoff.226 Thus, a rule al-
lowing an offensive use of the stay in these jurisdictions would create an
impossible dilemma for the bank. It may refuse to release the funds and
risk violation of the stay, or it may release the funds and risk waiver of
its setoff right.
The Code's specific mandate that courts honor a bank's state-law
setoff right is a clear direction that the debtor's burden/benefit linkage
must not be uncoupled in administrative freeze cases. Courts permit-
ting debtors to use the stay offensively by forcing the bank to release
funds on which it has a setoff right do violence to these specific Code
provisions. More significantly, these courts ignore one of the fundamen-
tal precepts underlying bankruptcy law: that a court should not force a
nondebtor party to provide additional benefits to a debtor unless the
debtor honors existing burdens to the nondebtor party.
E. Consumer Installment Cases
The last recurring category of cases in which courts allow debtors
to use the stay offensively does not fit neatly within the burden/benefit
paradigm that characterizes the others. In consumer installment cases it
almost appears that the creditor, not the debtor, is attempting to use
the rules of bankruptcy to improve its position.
The typical consumer installment case227 involves the following
facts: A consumer has purchased a car on credit through a secured loan
from a bank. Up to the time the consumer files Chapter 7 bankruptcy,
the consumer has been current on the car's installment loan. At the
time of bankruptcy filing, the value of the car is less than the current
outstanding balance on the loan. The loan agreement may or may not
have a clause providing that the consumer's filing of bankruptcy consti-
tutes a default under the loan agreement and accelerates all remaining
principal amounts under the loan.
Once in bankruptcy, the consumer wishes to keep making pay-
ments under the loan agreement and to retain possession of the car.
226. See, e.g., Holder v. Wilson (In re Wilson), 49 B.R. 19, 21 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1985); Na-
tional Bank of Boaz v. Royal Crown Bottling Co. of Boaz, Inc. (In re Royal Crown Bottling Co. of
Boaz, Inc.), 29 B.R. 52, 54 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1981).
227. See, e.g., Lowry Fed. Credit Union v. West, 882 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir. 1989); Berenguer v.
Bank South, N.A. (In re Berenguer), 77 B.R. 959 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); In re Cassell, 41 B.R. 737
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984); First and Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Ballance (In re Ballance), 33 B.R. 89
(Bankr. E.D. Va. 1983).
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The bank, on the other hand, wants to repossess the car and sell it
unless the consumer chooses one of two options: reaffirm the car loan,
or exercise the right to redeem the car. Neither option is particularly
attractive to the consumer. If he reaffirms, he is reaffirming not only the
portion of the loan that is currently secured, but the unsecured portion
as well. Thus, the consumer who reaffirms is in effect waiving the dis-
charge that would otherwise be applicable to the unsecured balance of
the bank's claim.22 In order to redeem the car, the consumer must
come up with sufficient cash to make a lump-sum payment equal to the
current fair market value of the car.22
Many courts have concluded that the debtor need not make this
choice, and may keep the car by merely continuing to make payments
pursuant to the original loan agreement.230 These courts point out that
the bank is protected by its right of repossession. If the consumer de-
faults on the loan after the bankruptcy case, the bank may repossess
228. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1988).
229. Section 722 of the Code governs the debtor's right to redeem. Under § 722, a debtor may
redeem personal property that is either exempted by the debtor or abandoned by the trustee by
paying the party holding the lien on the property the amount of that lienholder's secured claim.
Id. § 722. Although a few courts have held that a debtor may exercise the right to redemption
through installment payments, see, e.g., Clark v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Clark), 10 B.R. 605,
607 (Bankr. C.D. Il. 1981), a majority of courts considering the issue have held that the redemp-
tion right must be exercised through a lump sum payment. See General Motors Acceptance Corp.
v. Bell (In re Bell), 700 F.2d 1053, 1058 (6th Cir. 1983); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Schweitzer (In re
Schweitzer), 19 B.R. 860, 864 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
230. See West, 882 F.2d at 1546 (holding that the debtor is not forced to choose between
redemption and reaffirmation); In re Belanger, 118 B.R. 368, 372 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1990) (same);
Ballance, 33 B.R. at 91. But see In re Edwards, 901 F.2d 1383, 1387 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that
debtors must choose among redemption, reaffirmation, and surrender of the collateral); Bell, 700
F.2d at 1057 (same).
The debate about whether a consumer debtor who is current on installment payments may
retain the collateral by simply continuing to make payments has existed since the enactment of the
Code in 1979. The controversy took on a new dimension, however, with the Consumer Finance
Amendments to the Code in 1984. As part of the 1984 Amendments, Congress added § 521(2) to
the Code. Section 521(2)(A) requires every Chapter 7 debtor to file a statement of intention indi-
cating whether the debtor intends to retain or surrender liened property and, "if applicable,"
whether the debtor intends to redeem or reaffirm. 11 U.S.C. § 521(2)(A). Some courts have con-
cluded that the enactment of § 521(2) provides additional support for the conclusion that debtors
must choose between redemption and reaffirmation even if they are not in default at the time of
bankruptcy filing. See, e.g., Edwards, 901 F.2d at 1386-87. Other courts have held that the choices
outlined in § 521(2) are not exclusive, and that debtors may keep their collateral merely by contin-
uing to make installment payments as originally agreed. See, e.g., In re Hunter, 121 B.R. 609, 617
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1990). An analogous controversy involving consumer debtors, known as "lien-
stripping," is being heard before the Supreme Court. Dewsnup v. Timm (In re Dewsnup), 908 F.2d
588 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 949 (1991). In a lien-stripping case, a consumer is
allowed to use the lien avoidance language of § 506(d) to strip down an undersecured creditor's
lien on collateral to the value of the collateral. The consumer then is allowed to keep the collateral
by making installment payments on the new reduced principal balance of the secured creditor's
loan. See generally Margaret Howard, Stripping Down Liens: Section 506(d) and the Theory of
Bankruptcy, 65 Am. BANKR. L.J. 373 (1991).
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the car and sell it.23 The bank, however, is not allowed to pursue the
debtor for any deficiency remaining after such a foreclosure sale.23 2
The debtor's offensive use of the stay in these situations is not im-
mediately obvious. However, the automatic stay enables the debtor to
enjoy the continuing benefit of using the car on which the bank has a
lien without assuming all of the burdens that attach to that benefit. 33
A true assumption of the contract by the debtor would be a reaffirma-
tion, in which a later default by the debtor would enable the bank not
only to foreclose on its collateral but also to sue the debtor for the defi-
ciency. Reaffirmation by the debtor might be ill-advised, however, be-
cause the car's value in these cases is typically less than the debtor's
remaining obligation.23 4  That eventuality, however, does not justify
shielding the debtor from having to face the hard choice between re-
demption and reaffirmation.3 5
Courts permitting debtors to use the stay offensively in these cases
have stumbled in various ways. The red herring to which these courts
most commonly fall prey is the default-on-bankruptcy clauses con-
tained in some contracts.3 6 Many courts have jumped to the conclusion
231. See, e.g., Hunter, 121 B.R. at 616; In re Hughes, 95 B.R. 20, 22 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1989).
232. See, e.g., Hunter, 121 B.R. at 612; Hughes, 95 B.R. at 22-23.
233. Secured creditors in these cases have often sought a lift of the stay under § 362(d)(1) on
the basis either that cause existed or that the creditor would lack adequate protection if the debtor
failed to redeem or reaffirm. Courts have generally held that a debtor's continued payments on an
installment contract adequately protect a creditor during the pendency of the automatic stay. See,
e.g., Riggs Nat'l Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Perry (In re Perry), 729 F.2d 982, 984-85 (4th Cir.
1984); Wilson v. Colonial Am. Nat'l Bank (In re Wilson), 97 B.R. 285 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1989).
Perhaps more creditors should attempt to get a lift of the stay under § 362(d)(2). As long as the
creditor is undersecured, § 362(d)(2)(A) will be met, since the debtor by definition will have no
equity in the property. Furthermore, if the debtor has filed a Chapter 7 case, then § 362(d)(2)(B)
necessarily will be met since the property will not be necessary for an effective reorganization. This
approach was used successfully by the secured creditor in Gaglia v. First Federal Savings & Loan
(In re Gaglia), 76 B.R. 82 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1987).
234. The debtor may, however, attach greater value to the car than would the market. See
supra note 124.
235. As the court in Edwards points out, "the alternative of reaffirmation is not necessarily
onerous." Edwards, 901 F.2d at 1386 n.9. The Edwards court notes that even if the creditor refuses
to negotiate a reaffirmation, a lump-sum redemption need not be the debtor's only other option,
because "there is always the possibility of refinancing with a different lender." Id. Furthermore,
other courts have noted that many debtors also have the option of filing a Chapter 13 bankruptcy,
which would enable them to keep their collateral and pay only the value of the creditor's secured
claim in installments through the Chapter 13 plan. See, e.g., In re Whatley, 16 B.R. 394, 397
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1982). To be eligible to fie a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, an individual must have a
regular income, unsecured debts of less than $100,000, and secured debts of less than $350,000. 11
U.S.C. § 109(e).
236. See, e.g., Century Bank at Broadway v. Peacock (In re Peacock), 87 B.R. 657, 659
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (relying on the existence of an ipso facto clause to deny relief to a secured
creditor); Brock v. American Sec. Bank (In re Brock), 23 B.R. 998, 1003-04 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1982)
(deeming ipso facto clauses contrary to bankruptcy's fresh start policy).
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that these clauses must be invalid because the Code generally eschews
"ipso facto" clauses-clauses whose operation is triggered by the filing
of bankruptcy. 37 Thus, the courts conclude, once the ipso facto clause
is stricken, there is no default.2 s With no default, there is no accelera-
tion of the remaining balance, and the bank is effectively left with no
claim cognizable in bankruptcy. 3 9
This reliance on the invalidity of ipso facto clauses is flawed on two
fronts. First, the banks in these cases do not need ipso facto clauses in
order to cause the debtor's claim to accelerate upon the bankruptcy fil-
ing. The Code itself causes that result.40 One of the key purposes of
bankruptcy is to dispose of all claims against the debtor, whether ma-
tured or not, in a single forum at a distinct point in time. Accordingly,
through both its broad definition of "claim"241 and through specific leg-
islative history in the section on allowance of claims,242 the Code man-
dates that all unmatured claims are immediately due when a debtor
files bankruptcy.24
Second, the two ,sections of the Code that invalidate ipso facto
clauses do so for reasons that do not apply to installment loans. Section
365 will not allow an ipso facto clause to avoid the assumption of a
contract by the estate,2 44 and Section 541 will not allow an ipso facto
clause to prevent a debtor's property from coming into the estate.245
These clauses are not honored in bankruptcy because the debtor lacks
237. See, e.g., In re Winters, 69 B.R. 145, 147 (Bankr. D. Or. 1986) (finding an ipso facto
clause unenforceable).
238. See, e.g., West, 882 F.2d at 1546.
239. See, e.g., Ballance, 33 B.R. at 91. Although virtually none of these courts discuss the
claim question directly, courts that allow continued installment payments would never permit the
installment creditor to participate in any distribution that may occur. If the installment creditor
received a distribution on its claim and then continued to receive all of its remaining installment
payments following discharge, it would in effect be paid twice.
240. See infra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
241. In § 101(4), the definition of "claim" includes a right to payment, "whether or not such
right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, dis-
puted, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured." 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) (1988).
242. The legislative history of § 502 specifies that § 502(b) contains the principle that "bank-
ruptcy operates as the acceleration of the principal amount of all claims against the debtor."
HouSE COMM. ON THE JUDIcIARY, BANKRUPTCY LAW REvIsION, HR RE. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 353 (1977).
243. Section 502(b)(1) itself reinforces the notion that unmatured claims are allowable in
bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (providing that the court shall allow claims except when a claim
is unenforceable "for a reason other than because such claim is contingent or unmatured").
244. Id. § 365(e)(1)(A) (providing that executory contracts may not be terminated in bank-
ruptcy solely because of a provision that is conditioned on "the insolvency or financial condition of
the debtor").
245. Id. § 541(c)(1)(B) (providing that an interest of debtor in property becomes property of
the estate notwithstanding any provision "that is conditioned on the insolvency or financial condi-
tion of the debtor").
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the proper incentives to avoid inclusion of the clauses in prepetition
contracts.246
Suppose, for example, that a corporate debtor who is not in bank-
ruptcy is negotiating a contract with another party. Imagine that the
other party wishes to include a clause that would cause the contract to
be cancelled immediately if the debtor files bankruptcy. The debtor has
little reason to object to such a clause since the resulting costs ulti-
mately would be felt not by the debtor, but by the debtor's unsecured
creditors. When a debtor files bankruptcy, the claimants at the margin
will typically be the unsecured creditors of the debtor. Thus, if the con-
tract has value to the estate, its loss will be felt most directly not by the
shareholders or managers of the debtor, but by the parties whose claims
are then at the margin-the debtor's unsecured creditors.247
This danger is not present when the ipso facto clause purports to
make bankruptcy a default that will accelerate the outstanding princi-
pal balance of the loan. These clauses are common in the consumer in-
stallment cases. At worst, the ipso facto clauses in these cases are
merely superfluous because the Code itself accelerates all outstanding
claims against the debtor.24 s
The truly astounding aspect of the consumer installment cases is
that the creditor is left with no claim in the bankruptcy, but neverthe-
less suffers a discharge of the unsecured portion of the debtor's obliga-
tion to it. Basic fairness as well as the Code itself dictate that a creditor
who incurs the cost of discharge should, at a minimum, be entitled to
participate in whatever distribution the debtor's estate affords.249 Yet
some courts allowing offensive uses of the stay in consumer installment
cases would give the bank the worst of all worlds: the court would re-
fuse to lift the stay to allow a foreclosure, discharge the unsecured por-
tion of the bank's debt, and then refuse to allow the bank to participate
246. Nimmer, supra note 59, at 540-41.
247. Id.
248. See supra notes 241-43 and accompanying text.
249. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b) (providing that a discharge in Chapter 7 discharges the debtor
from all prepetition debts and any liability on a claim under § 502); id. § 726(a)(2) (providing for
the distribution of property of the estate in payment of any allowed unsecured claim following
payment of § 507 priority claims). The reality in most of these consumer installment cases is that
the unsecured creditors will receive nothing. See Rendeman, supra note 28, at 724 (noting that
"few consumer bankrupts own enough assets to administer"); see also Charles S. Hallinan, The
"Fresh Start" Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an Interpretive The-
ory, 21 U. RICH. L. REv. 49, 50 n.2 (1986) (observing that prior to enactment of the Code, 85% of all
"straight" bankruptcy filings by individuals were no-asset cases, and experience under the Code
"suggest[s] that the situation has not materially improved"). Nevertheless, the notion that a credi-
tor of the debtor is not a claimant and yet should have her unsecured liability discharged is funda-
mentally inconsistent.
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in the case as a claimant.50
IV. THE COSTS OF OFFENSIVE STAY USE
A. Corporate Cases
There is an inherent tension in the role of corporate bankruptcy.
As one commentator points out, bankruptcy should not be a place
where companies can painlessly void commercial contracts.2 51 Alterna-
tively, an overly strict adherence to the debtor's state-law obligations
may "cripple bankruptcy's legitimate functions.
'2 52
Corporate bankruptcy's legitimate functions include the equal
treatment of equally situated creditors and the preservation of existing
going-concern values.2 53 When courts allow debtors to use the stay of-
fensively, they unwittingly do violence to both of these fundamental
principles of bankruptcy.
As mentioned earlier, many courts use the phrase "equality of
treatment" without the key qualification: "equal treatment of equally
situated creditors. '25 4 As the Supreme Court has recognized on more
than one occasion, property rights in bankruptcy are defined by refer-
ence to state law.255 Thus, an unsecured creditor with leverage effective
under state law is clearly in a different position than a creditor who
lacks such leverage.
This notion of leverage recognition in bankruptcy pervades such
250. These decisions also create perverse incentives for debtors to maintain the collateral
adequately. If a creditor's only recourse following discharge is to await default and then foreclose
on the collateral, the debtor will not suffer fully the effects of the collateral's depreciation. See In
re Whittaker, 85 B.R. 788, 793 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988) (noting these incentive problems and
stating that it would be "wholly inequitable" to permit debtors to retain the collateral by continu-
ing their payments without personal liability).
251. Westbrook, supra note 53, at 229.
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., HousE COMM. ON THE JuDICIARY, BANKRUPTCY LAW REVISION, HR REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 220 (1977) (stating that the premise of business reorganization is that a com-
pany's assets are worth more in a going concern than they are if sold for scrap); see also NLRB v.
Martin Arsharn Sewing Co., 873 F.2d 884, 887 (6th Cir. 1989) (asserting that the theme of bank-
ruptcy is equality of distribution).
254. See Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1962) (noting Congress's policy in the
Bankruptcy Act of "equitable distribution of assets among creditors" and citing lien holders as an
exception thereto); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Moritz (In re Iowa R.R. Co.), 840 F.2d 535, 538 (7th Cir.
1988) (citing the doctrine of "equal treatment of all creditors under Title 11" (citations omitted));
see also Citicorp Acceptance Co. v. Robinson (In re Sweetwater), 884 F.2d 1323, 1328 (10th Cir.
1989) (noting the "basic bankruptcy purpose of treating all similarly situated creditors alike").
255. See, e.g., Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 285-86 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating
that absent federal policy to the contrary, property rights in bankruptcy are defined by state law)
(citing Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979)).
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Code concepts as executory contract assumption,2 56 reaffirmation2 5 7
and set-off.258 The benefit/burden linkage is also inherent in such well-
established bankruptcy case law doctrines as lien pass-through, 25 9 the
general validity of nonbankruptcy transfer restrictions2 60 cross-collater-
alization, 21 and the doctrine of necessity.2 62 In almost every offensive
stay case, the court violates the equality of treatment principle by at-
tempting to put the creditor with leverage on a par with a creditor who
lacks such an advantageous position.26 3
Bankruptcy's unique contribution to the goal of preserving a corpo-
ration's going-concern value is that it halts the potentially destructive
race among creditors to liquidate a debtor in piecemeal fashion. 26 4 The
automatic stay is the procedural device that accomplishes this end.265
When the debtor can use the stay as a weapon to insist on future bene-
fits from certain creditors without honoring prepetition burdens, the ef-
fects of the stay dramatically change.
256. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1) (1988); see also supra text accompanying note 38 (discussing §
365).
257. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c); see also supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (discussing
§ 524).
258. See 11 U.S.C. § 553; see also supra text accompanying note 42.
259. See, e.g., Long v. Bullard, 117 U.S. 617 (1886) (allowing secured creditors whose claims
are not satisfied in full to pursue collateral in hands of the debtor following bankruptcy, notwith-
standing discharge). This doctrine has arguably been codified by 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2), which says
that a discharge enjoins any creditor's actions to recover on such debts with respect to the "per-
sonal liability of the debtor." See H.R. REP. No. 595, at 361 (stating that "[t]he bankruptcy dis-
charge will not prevent enforcement of valid liens"); see also supra text accompanying notes 43-45
(discussing § 522).
260. See, e.g., California v. Farmers Markets, Inc. (In re Farmers Markets, Inc.), 792 F.2d
1400 (9th Cir. 1986); see also supra note 46 and accompanying text.
261. See, e.g., In re Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 115 B.R. 34, 39 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); see also
supra text accompanying note 47.
262. See, e.g., United States v. Midwest Serv. and Supply Co. (In re Midwest Serv. and Sup-
ply Co.), 44 B.R. 262, 265-66 (D. Utah 1983); see also supra text accompanying note 48.
263. There is one species of state law leverage that bankruptcy law correctly ignores: the
leverage obtained by creditors who have attempted to opt out of bankruptcy's collective proceed-
ing at the last minute. This is the underlying rationale behind bankruptcy's preference provisions,
which strip away state law leverage that creditors have obtained in the 90 days prior to bankruptcy
or, in the case of insiders, within one year prior to the filing. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (discussing
preferences); see also JACKSON, supra note 61, at 125 (explaining that preference law "is essentially
a transitional rule designed to prevent individual creditors from opting out of the collective pro-
ceeding once that event becomes likely").
264. See BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 56, at 39-42; see also Tringali v. Hathaway Machinery
Co., 796 F.2d 553, 562 (1st Cir. 1986) (pointing out that the stay enables creditors to replace the
race and other systems of debt collection with a more orderly distribution of assets).
265. See Kennedy, supra note 25 at 61-62 (asserting that the stay is necessary to prevent
creditors from improving their positions by resorting to means not under control of bankruptcy
court); see also Murray Tabb, Competing Policies in Bankruptcy: The Governmental Exception
to the Automatic Stay, 21 TuLSA L.J. 183, 184 (1985) (suggesting that the purposes of the stay are
to give the debtor a respite and to prevent creditors from having to engage in a race to the debtor's
assets).
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The stay becomes a device by which the debtor, as well as creditors
who lack leverage, may strip away the leverage held by other creditors.
Bankruptcy becomes a means by which the relative positions among
parties are transformed rather than a costly last resort to avoid the ef-
fects of a possible state law race to the debtor's assets.2 66 Once courts
allow the stay to be used offensively, forum-shopping will inevitably
result.
Imagine, for example, a furniture business that is struggling finan-
cially, but is nevertheless worth more as a going concern than it would
be if it were liquidated in piecemeal fashion.267 Suppose further that a
particular supplier of the furniture store offers the debtor a type of fur-
niture that the debtor both needs and cannot readily obtain elsewhere.
The supplier delivers a large shipment of furniture to the debtor on
credit. The debtor has not yet paid the supplier for the shipment, and
the debtor sells the furniture and uses the cash for other operating
expenses.
The debtor then wants additional furniture from the supplier.
Moreover, the debtor is willing to pay cash in advance. The supplier
refuses to sell any more furniture, even on a cash basis, until the debtor
pays for the most recent shipment on credit. The debtor would proba-
bly take the deal on the supplier's terms, because its managers believe
that this supplier's furniture is crucial to the continued operation of the
business.
Suppose that there are a half-dozen other unsecured creditors of
the debtor who lack the leverage enjoyed by this particular supplier.
These other creditors are irked that the furniture store is planning to
extinguish its debt to the supplier, but not its debt to them. In a world
in which courts allow offensive use of the automatic stay, these other
creditors will have a perverse incentive to see the furniture store in
bankruptcy, even when the store's going-concern value could be less ex-
pensively preserved outside of bankruptcy.
2 6 8
266. See Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REv. 953, 957-58
(noting that whenever bankruptcy changes the relative nonbankruptcy entitlements among un-
secured creditors, secured creditors and the debtor, "a new and costly level of planning becomes
inevitable"). In addition to the strategic costs incurred as a result of such a change in relative
entitlements, the bankruptcy process itself is anything but inexpensive for the creditor group. The
administrative costs of a typical Chapter 11 reorganization in which a creditors' committee is ap-
pointed have been estimated at $100,000. Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate Reor-
ganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127, 135 n.13 (1986).
267. It may often be the case that an insolvent company is worth more as a going concern
than if it is liquidated piecemeal. A simple example is the case of Johns-Manville, which had a
significant going-concern surplus even though it would have been unable to pay in full all of the
asbestos-related tort claims against it. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1984).
268. See BAIRD & JACKSON, supra note 56, at 41 (noting that often corporations are more
[Vol. 45:71
1991] OFFENSIVE USES OF THE BANKRUPTCY STAY 125
The basis of the other creditors' perverse incentive is that if the
debtor is in bankruptcy, the supplier's state law leverage will be
stripped away by the debtor's offensive use of the automatic stay. Thus,
bankruptcy will enable the other creditors to improve their positions
relative to the supplier with leverage. When bankruptcy becomes a
place where the relative rights of parties are altered vis-a-vis state law,
those whose rights will improve in bankruptcy will tend to shop for the
bankruptcy forum whether or not bankruptcy is in the best interests of
creditors as a group. It is this sort of forum-shopping problem that the
Supreme Court decried when it held in Butner v. United States that,
absent some specific federal policy to the contrary, property rights in
bankruptcy ought to be defined by state law. s9
B. Individual Cases
The function of bankruptcy for individual debtors must also strike
a balance between competing concerns. To say that the goal of personal
bankruptcy is to give the debtor a "fresh start" does not adequately
define the precise effects of discharge on an individual.
On the one hand, most commentators would agree that discharge
should not be completely costless to debtors.270 If it were, there would
be a tremendous disincentive for individuals to honor contractual obli-
gations.27 1 Furthermore, in a world in which discharge held no collateral
consequences for debtors, the market for credit would be severely
limited.272
On the other hand, if an individual's discharge could be achieved
only at the cost of complete satisfaction of all claims, many debt-laden
individuals would lack the incentive to become productive members of
society. A debtor's desire to work and earn an income would be signifi-
cantly reduced if a large portion of her effort would benefit her credi-
cheaply reorganized outside of a compulsory workout process such as bankruptcy).
The ability of creditors to force an involuntary bankruptcy is governed by § 303. If a debtor
has fewer than 12 creditors, it takes one or more creditors holding in the aggregate at least $5000
in noncontingent, undisputed, unsecured claims to force the debtor into bankruptcy. For a debtor
with 12 or more creditors, an involuntary bankruptcy petition requires three or more creditors
holding a total of at least $5000 in unsecured claims that are neither contingent nor disputed. 11
U.S.C. § 303(b).
269. 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (asserting that an important reason for the uniform treatment of
property interests inside and outside of bankruptcy is to discourage forum shopping).
270. See, e.g., Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L.
REv. 1393, 1427 (1985) (asserting "[tihat the exercise of the right of discharge should come at some
cost, however, is not-or at least should not be-an open question" (emphasis in original)).
271. See Eisenberg, supra note 266, at 976-77 (explaining that allowing a bankruptcy dis-
charge "merely upon request" would create "obvious disincentives to perform contracts").
272. See Jackson, supra note 270, at 1427 (stating that "[b]ecause of the nature of credit,
free access to discharge would be disastrous for a credit-based economy").
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tors rather than herself.27 3
The Code strikes a balance between these competing objectives by
allowing the debtor a discharge, but not without a cost. One cost of
discharge is that the debtor must submit all of his nonexempt property
to the court for distribution.24 Furthermore, the Code's reaffirmation
provisions require a debtor wishing to receive specific future benefits
from a creditor to waive the potential discharge with respect to that
creditor. 5
The perverse incentives that the bankruptcy discharge offers debt-
ors will be exacerbated to the extent that offensive uses of the stay re-
duce the collateral consequences to the debtor of filing bankruptcy.
Many debtors file bankruptcy for reasons beyond their control. 271 But
some consumer filings result from circumstances that the debtor could
have avoided. 7
If the bankruptcy discharge is a form of insurance for the individ-
ual debtor's financial disasters, then attaching some collateral conse-
quences to the discharge will make it less likely to occur. The notion of
discharge as insurance highlights the reality that discharge presents a
moral hazard for debtors.278
In the insurance field, insurers use a copayment mechanism to re-
273. See Rendleman, supra note 28, at 726 (noting that when a debtor is doomed to spend
his life working for his creditors, his motive to work may be destroyed); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt,
292 U.S. 234, 245 (1934) (observing that "[flrom the viewpoint of the wage-earner there is little
difference between not earning at all and earning wholly for a creditor"); see also Steven L. Harris,
A Reply to Theodore Eisenberg's Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 30 UCLA L. REv. 327, 341
(1982) (suggesting that fresh start promotes the debtor's rehabilitation by giving him sufficient
freedom from the demands of his creditors and sufficient assets to enable him to become an eco-
nomically productive member of society).
274. See Jackson, supra note 270, at 1426-27. The reality, of course, is that this cost is negli-
gible for most individual debtors who file bankruptcy. See supra note 249. Dean Jackson identifies
as an additional cost of the bankruptcy discharge a consequence that is not specified in the Code:
the individual "puts others on notice that he might resort to [bankruptcy] again," thus
"decreas[ing] his access to credit in the future." Jackson, supra note 270, at 1427.
275. 11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1988).
276. See Rendleman, supra note 28, at 766 (contending that increasing liberalization of
bankruptcy law suggests that society "assumed that poor debtors were not responsible for their
troubles").
277. See Eisenberg, supra note 266, at 980 (suggesting that some individual bankruptcies are
"negligent"); William H. Meckling, Financial Markets, Default, and Bankruptcy: The Role of the
State, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs., Autumn 1977, at 13, 16 (asserting that the more costly default is to
the debtor, the less likely that the debtor will default); cf. Hallinan, supra note 249, at 89 (noting
that the increased number of consumer filings following the enactment of the Code prompted some
to wonder whether the Code had caused some individuals who did not "need" bankruptcy to file
nevertheless to obtain its protection).
278. See Jackson, supra note 270, at 1428 n.114. Insurance generally creates a moral hazard
for the insured party because those who are insured against certain risks have an incentive to use
less than optimal care to avoid those risks. See CAROL A. HEiMER, REAcTIvE RISK AND RATIONAL
ACTION 28-32 (1985).
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duce the moral hazard problem even when the insured's control over
the insurable event is arguably minimal.279 Prohibiting an individual
debtor from using the stay offensively is akin to forcing the debtor to
make copayments for his discharge insurance. The result is that the
debtor has additional incentive to avoid filing bankruptcy, to the extent
that the event is within the debtor's control.
One commentator has suggested that a way to limit "negligent
bankruptcies" by consumers is to insist that, as a condition of dis-
charge, the debtor contribute some portion of future earnings to the
payment of prepetition claims.28 0 That proposal has been criticized on
the ground that Congress gave debtors the right to choose whether and
to what extent they will surrender postpetition earnings to prepetition
creditors.281 On the other hand, a simple refusal to allow offensive uses
of the stay will provide many of the advantages of both positions.
Because it forces debtors to assume prepetition burdens in order to
receive postpetition benefits, the debtor's discharge has collateral con-
sequences. Those consequences will serve as a check on the debtor's
moral hazard and will help to avoid bankruptcies that the debtor is able
to prevent. At the same time, the debtor alone will decide which prepe-
tition burdens are worth assuming and what portion of future income to
allocate to prepetition claims.
There is an additional benefit to be gained from the collateral con-
sequences that attach to a debtor's discharge when offensive uses of the
stay are prohibited. The beneficiaries of the increased cost of the
debtor's discharge will be more willing to extend credit to those finan-
cially struggling individuals who need it the most. This will not result
from an altruistic desire on the part of goods and service providers to
give a break to a financially struggling customer. Rather, to the extent
that a prospective customer's future discharge becomes less costly to a
merchant creditor, the merchant's ultimate prospects of making a net
279. As Heimer notes, depending on the particular risk the insurance covers, the policyholder
can exercise anything between no control and complete control over losses. HEIMER, supra note
278, at 9. Even when the insured has little control over the insured risk-storm-weather damage,
for example-the insured may be responsible for a deductible and copayments. This makes sense,
however, because the amount of damage incurred by a homeowner, even in a storm, may be a
function of precautions that the homeowner takes.
280. Eisenberg, supra note 266, at 980 (suggesting that linking discharge to some effort to
repay out of future earnings would help create a self-regulating mechanism by which debtors
would avoid negligent bankruptcies).
281. See Harris, supra note 273, at 350-51; cf. Douglas G. Boshkoff, Limited, Conditional,
and Suspended Discharges in Anglo-American Bankruptcy Proceedings, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 69,
118 (1982) (noting problems that arise when courts condition discharge on something other than a
fixed level of payment by the debtor: the judge "inevitably . . . become[s] an arbiter of the
debtor's lifestyle").
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
profit on such a marginal customer will necessarily increase.282
V. CONCLUSION
The automatic and postdischarge stays are fundamental bank-
ruptcy devices used both to give corporate debtors the chance to pre-
serve going-concern values and to afford individual debtors the
opportunity for a financial fresh start. The historical development of
the two stays implies, however, that Congress never intended them to
enable the debtor to insist on future benefits from nondebtor parties
without assuming corresponding burdens to that same party.
Such offensive uses of the stay are contrary to the corporate bank-
ruptcy goals of value preservation and equality of treatment among
creditors. Furthermore, in individual cases, the reduction in collateral
consequences of bankruptcy that result from offensive uses of the stay
exacerbates the moral hazard that the discharge necessarily creates for
individual debtors. Such costs in both corporate and individual bank-
ruptcies can be avoided if courts truly adhere to the maxim that the
stay ought to be used as a shield and not as a sword.
282. See Meckling, supra note 277, at 16 ("The borrower knows that the more confident the
lender is that he will be repaid, the more willing he will be to extend a loan, and the lower the
interest rate will be."); id. at 21 (stating that if bankruptcy law increases lending costs, those costs
will in the long run be passed on to the borrower).
[Vol. 45:71128
